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INDIAN RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS?
By FELIX S. COHEN
"Were there no injustice, men would -never have known the 'name
of justice." Heraclitus.O UT of the long train of injustices committed by a conquering
race there has developed the concern for justice that is so
overwhelming a part of Indian character today.
Those who would like to see Indians earning a living as happy
American farmers are distressed that so many Indians should
indulge in endless discussions about broken treaties or consti-
tutional rights at a time when the application of equivalent ener-
gies to crops and livestock would bring larger productive returns.
Some philanthropic souls are distressed to note that when an
Indian receives a few dollars from the government he does not
always accept the money humbly or shame-facedly, as a white man
might accept a Salvation Army Thanksgiving basket, but often
takes greater pride in winning a small sum from the United States
Government than he would take in earning a larger sum by
growing potatoes. Perhaps those who take this attitude towards
the Indian fail to see how much of human dignity, in Indian eyes,
may turn upon the willingness to stand up for one's rights, without
regard to economic cost or gain. But whether one sympathizes
with this aspect of contemporary Indian culture or dismisses it as
uneconomic and neurotic, he cannot-help recognizing the fact that
Indians are deeply concerned with the maintenance of justice and
the defense of their legal rights.
The train of injustices which the Indian has suffered has
again and again led Indian champions of Indian rights to go
before the federal courts to challenge as unlawful particular acts
of oppression by federal and state officials as well as by private
tThis article represents only my views, was written prior to my
appointment as Chief of the Indian Law Survey of the Department of
Justice and is in no way an expression of Departmental opinion. F. S. C.
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individuals. In these cases, the Indian has often had the assistance
of the most able counsel of other races. In the judicial decisions
that have come down as a result of these challenges, one finds
what is probably the most vigorous defense of the rights of a
racial minority that exists within our jurisprudence. Those who
have criticised the decisions of federal courts in other fields as
lacking in a proper respect for the rights of oppressed groups
in society never have directed that criticism at federal decisions on
Indian questions. Unfortunately, however, the role of the fed-
eral judiciary, as a protector of Indian rights, has never yet been
adequately recorded.-
It should be clear at the outset that Indians are citizens of the
United States,2 entitled to all the rights which non-Indians may
claim under general laws and constitutions. If an Indian is
accused of counterfeiting he is entitled to a jury trial, just as
any other citizen would be. There is no special Indian question
involved in the case. The fact that one of the parties in a case is
an Indian does not raise a question of Indian rights. In this
paper, therefore, we shall not attempt to treat the rights which
Indians share with all their fellow citizens, such as the right of
free speech, the right of jury trial for federal offenses, and the
right to be immune from slavery. We shall consider only those
rights that have a special relation to the position of the Indian in
American law. These rights are of three sorts:
1. The Right of Self-Government. Indians who are members
of an existing tribe have a special political relationship to each
other, out of which the right of self-government may emerge*
The extent of this right will be the first object of our inquiry.
2. Civil Liberties of Indians. Indians have been given a
peculiar position under various statutes and administrative prac-
tices intended for their protection, civilization or eradication, and
the question therefore arises: "What rights may the Indians in-
'Three excellent articles on the law governing Indian affairs deal
briefly with certain aspects of Indian rights: Rice, The Position of the
American Indian in the Law of the United States. (1934) 16 J. Comp. Leg.
(3rd ser.) pt. 1, p. 78; Brown. The Indian Problem and the Law, (1930)
39 Yale L. 3. 307; Pound, Nationals without a Nation, (1922) 22 Col.
L. Rev. 97.
The standard compilation of laws and treaties governing Indian affairs
is Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (2d ed. 1904) vols. 14.
2"All Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States
are declared to be citizens of the United States. The granting of citizen-
ship to Indians shall not in any manner affect the right of any Indian to
tribal or other property." (Act of June 2, 1924; 43 Stat. at L. 253,
U. S. C., Title 8, sec. 3, 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 3.)
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yoke to protect themselves against oppression under such special
statutes and practices ?"
3. Property Rights of Indians. Indian property is very largely
property over which the federal government exercises a special
control. The question thus arises: "What rights does the Indian
have with respect to Indian property?"
It will be the purpose of this paper to chart the content of
these Indian rights, with particular reference to the governing
decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
1. THE RIGHT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
among the arts of civilized life ... was the highest and
best of all, that self-government, the regulation by themselves of their
own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their
own members by the administration of their own laws and customs."3
The Indian's right of self-government is a right which has
been honored by essay writers, consistently protected by the courts,
grudgingly recognized and intermittently ignored by legislators,
and systematically undermined by administrative officials. The
most basic of all Indian rights, it is the Indian's last defense
against bureaucratic oppression, for in a realm where the states
are powerless to govern and where Congress, occupied with more
pressing national affairs, cannot govern wisely and well, there
remains a large no-man's-land in which government can emanate
only from officials of the Interior Department or from the Indians
themselves. Self-government is thus the Indians' only alterna-
tive to rule by a government department.
Indian self-government, the decided cases hold, includes the
power of an Indian tribe to adopt and operate under a form of
government of the Indians' choosing, to define conditions of tribal
membership, to regulate domestic relations of members, to pre-
scribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate property
within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to control the conduct of
members by municipal legislation, and to administer justice.4
The right of self-government is not something granted to the
Indians by any act of Congress. It is rather an inherent and
original right of the Indian tribes, recognized by courts and legis-
lators, a right of which the Indian tribes never have been deprived.
The analysis of this right, therefore, takes us back to the first
3From the opinion of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Crow Dog,
(1883) 109 U. S. 556, 568, 3 Sup. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030.
4Powers of Indian Tribes, (1934) 55 I. D. 14, 65-67.
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governuental contacts between the federal government and our
Indian tribes.
The nature of these contacts is set forth with lucidity in the
classic opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Worcester
v. Georgia,' from which the following excerpts are taken:
"America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was in-
habited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, inde-
pendent of each other, and of the rest of the world, having
institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own
laws. It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the in-
habitants of either quarter of the globe could have rightful
original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or
over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either, by the
other, should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered,
which annulled the pre-existing right of its ancient possessors....6
"But power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession,
are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted
by those on whom they descend .... 7
"To avoid bloody conflicts, which might terminate disastrously
to all, it was necessary for the nations of Europe to establish
some principle which all would acknowledge, and which should
decide their respective rights as between themselves. This prin-
ciple, suggested by the actual state of things, was, 'that discovery
gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, it was made, against all other European governments,
which title might be consummated by possession' (8 Wheat. 573).
This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was
the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making
the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of
acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it. It was an ex-
clusive principle, which shut out the right of competition among
those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous
rights of those who had not agreed to it .... The United States
succeeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and
political; but no attempt so far as is known, has been made to
enlarge them.""
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time im-
memorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
particular region claimed; and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
5(1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483.6p. 541.
7p. 543.
8P. 543.
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Indians. The very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them,
means 'a people distinct from others.'9
".... the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker
power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-
government-by associating with a stronger, and taking its pro-
tection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may
place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without
stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a
state. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe. 'Tribu-
tary and feudatory states,' says Vattel, 'do not thereby cease to
be sovereign and independent states, so long as self-government,
and sovereign and independent authority, are left in the administra-
tion of the state.' At the present day, more than one state may
be considered as holding its right of self-government under the
guarantee and protection of one or more allies.
"The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupy-
ing its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citi-
zens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with
the acts of Congress."'"
John Marshall's analysis of the basis of Indian self-government
in the law of nations has been followed consistently by the courts
for more than a hundred years. The doctrine set forth in this
opinion has been applied to an unfolding series of new problems
in scores of cases that have come before the Supreme Court and
the inferior federal courts. The doctrine has not always been so
highly respected in state courts and by administrative authorities.
It was of the decision in Worcester v. Georgia that President
Jackson is reported to have said, "John Marshall has made his
decision; now let him enforce it.""'  As a matter of history, .the
state of Georgia, unsuccessful defendant in the case, never did
carry out the Supreme Court's decision, and the "successful"
plaintiff, a guest of the Cherokee nation, continued to languish in
a Georgia prison, under a Georgia law which, according to the
Supreme Court decision, was unconstitutional.
The case in which the doctrine of Indian self-government was
first established has a certain prophetic character. Administrative
officials for a century afterwards continued to ignore the broad
implications of the judicial doctrine of Indian self-government.
But again and again, as cases came before the federal courts, ad-
ministrative officials, state and federal, were forced to reckon
Op. 559.
'Op. 560.
"1 Greeley, American Conflict 106.
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with the doctrine of Indian self-government and to surrender
powers of Indian tribes which they sought to usurp. Finally, after
101 years, there appeared an administration that accepted the
logical implications of Indian self-government -.1 2
During the 101 years following the Supreme Court's decision
in Worcester v. Georgia the right of Indian self-government was
tested in ten major cases. 13  These cases constitute the skeleton
of the federal law governing Indian tribes.
1. Tribal Authority Over Crimes. The first major test of the
principle of Indian self-government following the decision in
Worcester v. Georgia arose in the case, Ex parte Crow Dog.1 4
Crow Dog was a famous Sioux warrior who found occasion to
slay his fellow-tribesman Spotted Tail. The murder excited
nation-wide interest. Crow Dog was tried in a federal court,
found guilty of murder and condemned to death. His attorney
sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, claiming
that his client was not amenable to the criminal laws of the United
States or of the Dakota Territory, but was governed in his rela-
tions with other Indians on reservations purely by tribal law and
12The most comprehensive piece of Indian legislation since the Acts
of June 30, 1834, (4 Stat. at L. 729, 735) is the Act of June 18, 1934, (48
Stat. at L. 984; U.S. C., Title 25, sec. 461-479, 25 U.S.C.A. secs. 461-479),
entitled "An Act to conserve and develop Indian lands and resources; to
extend to Indians the right to form business and other organizations; to
establish a credit system for Indians; to grant certain rights of home rule
to Indians; to provide for vocational education for Indians; and for other
purposes," and commonly known as the Wheeler-Howard Act or Indian
Reorganization Act. Since its enactment, this statute has been amended in
minor particulars (Act of June 15, 1935, 49 Stat. at L. 378, U.S. C., Title
25, secs. 478a, 478b; Act of August 12, 1935, sec. 2, 49 Stat. at L. 596, U.S.
C., Title 25, sec. 475a; Act of August 28, 1937, 50 Stat. at L. 862, U.S. C.,
Title 25, secs. 463-463c), and its more important provisions have been
extended to Alaska (Act of May 1, 1936, 49 Stat. at L. 1250, U.S. C., Title
48, sec. 362) and Oklahoma (Act of June 26, 1936, 49 Stat. at L. 1967, U.S.
C., Title 25, secs. 501-509).
1SEx parte Crow Dog, (1883) 109 U. S. 556, 3 Sup. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed.
1030; Standley v. Roberts, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1894) 59 Fed. 836, app. dis.
(1896) 17 Sup. Ct. 999, 41 L. Ed. 1177; Talton v. Mayes, (1896) 163 U. S.
376, 16 Sup. Ct. 986, 41 L. Ed. 196; Waldron v. United States, (C.C. S.D.
1905) 143 Fed. 413; Jones v. Meehan, (1899) 175 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 1,
44 L. Ed. 49; Buster v. Wright, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 135 Fed. 947, app.
dis.. (1906) 203 U. S. 599, 27 Sup. Ct. 777, 51 L. Ed. 334; Cherokee Nation
v. Journeycake, (1894) 155 U. S. 196, 15 Sup. Ct. 55, 39 L. Ed. 120; United
States v. Quiver, (1916) 241 U. S. 602, 36 Sup. Ct. 699, 60 L. Ed. 1196;
Turner v. United States and Creek Nation, 51 Ct. Cls. 125 (aff'd (1919)
248 U.S. 354, 39 Sup. Ct. 109, 63 L. Ed. 291); Pueblo of Santa Rosa v.
Fall, (1927) 273 U. S. 315, 47 Sup. Ct. 361, 71 L. Ed. 658.
14(1883) 109 U. S. 556, 3 Sup. Ct. 396, 27 L. Ed. 1030.
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was responsible only to tribal authorities. This contention was
sustained by the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion.15
In the Crow Dog Case the government argued that federal
criminal jurisdiction was established by the force of a treaty with
the Sioux Nation containing the following clause:
"And Congress shall, by appropriate legislation, secure to
them an orderly government; they shall be subject to the laws
of the United States, and each individual shall be protected in his
rights of property, person, and life."10
Answering this argument, the Supreme Court declared, per Mat-
thews, J.:
"It is equally clear, in our opinion, that these words can have
no such effect as that claimed for them. The pledge to secure to
these people, with whom the United States -was contracting as a
distinct political body, an orderly government, by appropriate
legislation thereafter to be framed and enacted, necessarily im-
plies, having regard to all the circumstances attending the tran-
saction, that among the arts of civilized life, which it was the very
purpose of all these arrangement§ to introduce and naturalize
among them, was the highest and best of all, that of self-govern-
ment, the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs,
the maintenance of order and peace among their own members
by the administration of their own laws and customs."
1 7
The case of Crow Dog did not deny the power of Congress to
legislate over Indian affairs and to curtail, if it saw fit, the scope
of Indian self-government. It simply pointed to the fact that
Congress never had legislated in this field. Federal criminal
statutes governing places "within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States" had been extended to the Indian coun-
try"8 but subject to the specific limitation that they should not
"be construed to extend to crimes committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any
15 To the same effect see (1883) 17 Op. Att. Gen. 566, 570, in which an
Indian of Tribe A murdered an Indian of Tribe B on the reservation of
Tribe C. The attorney general declared: "If no demand for Foster's sur-
render shall be made by one or other of the tribes, founded fairly upon
a violation of some law of one or other of them having jurisdiction of the
offense in question according to general principles, and forms substantially
conformable to natural justice, it seems that nothing remains except to dis-
charge him." See, to the same effect, State v. McKenney, (1883) 18 Nev.
182. See also Report Judiciary Committee declaring: "Their right to self-
government, and to administer justice among themselves, after their rude
fashion, even to inflicting the death penalty, has never been questioned."
Sen. Rep. No. 268, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess.
'(At p. 568.
17At pp. 568-569.
28Act of June 30, 1834, sec. 25, 4 Stat. at L. 733; amended by Act of
March 27, 1854, sec. 3, 10 Stat. at L. 270; U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 217, 25
U. S. C. A. sec. 217.
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Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been
punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses
is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.""'
So much consternation was created by the Supreme Court's
decision in Ex parte Crow Dog that within two years Congress
had enacted a law making it a federal crime for one Indian to
murder another Indian on an Indian reservation. 20  This law also
prohibited manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson,
burglary, and larceny. In later years notorious cases of robbery,
incest, and assault with a dangerous weapon resulted in the piece-
meal addition of these three offenses to the federal code of Indian
crimes.21 There are thus, at the present time, ten major offenses
for which federal jurisdiction has displaced tribal jurisdiction.
Federal courts also have jurisdiction over the ordinary federal
crimes applicable throughout the United States (such as counter-
feiting, smuggling,2 2 and offenses relative to the mails), over
violations of special laws for the protection of Indians, 23 and
over offenses committed by an Indian against a non-Indian or by a
non-Indian against an Indian which fall within the special code
of offenses for territory "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States. ' 24  All offenses other than these remain subject
to tribal law and .custom and to tribal courts.
It is important to remember that although Indians are citizens
of the states in which they reside, they are immune from state con-
'
9Act of June 30, 1834, see. 25, 4 Stat. at L. 733; amended by Act of
March 27, 1854, sec. 3, 10 Stat. at L. 270; U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 218, 25
U. S. C. A. see. 218.2 Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. at L. 385, U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 548,
18 U. S. C. A. sec. 548.21Act of March 4, 1909, sec. 328, 35 Stat. at L. 1151; Act of June 28,
1932, 47 Stat. at L. 337.
22See Bailey v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 702,
confirming conviction of tribal Indian for offense of smuggling.23See U. S. Code, Title 18, secs. 104 (timber depredations on Indian
lands), 107 (starting fires on Indian lands) ; 110 (breaking fences or driving
cattle on inclosed public lands); 115 (inducing conveyances by Indians of
trust interests in lands) ; U. S. Code, Title 25, sec. 83 (receipt of money
under prohibited contracts) ; 177 (purchases or grants of land from
Indians) ; 179 (driving stock to feed on Indian lands) ; 180 (settling on or
surveying lands belonging to Indians by treaty) ; 195 (sale of cattle pur-
chased by government to nontribal members) ; 212 (arson) ; 213 (assault
with intent to kill) ; 214 (disposing or removing cattle) ; 216 (hunting on
Indian lands); 241 (intoxicating liquors: sale to Indians or introducing
into Indian country) ; 241a (sale, etc. of liquors in former Indian terri-
tory) ; 244 (possession of intoxicating liquors in Indian country) ; 251
(setting up distillery) ; 264 (trading without license) ; 265 (prohibited pur-
chases and sales) ; 266 (sale of arms).
24See U. S. C., Title 18, chaps. 11 and 13, 18 U. S. C. A. chs. 11, 13.
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trol for actions within their own reservations.2 5  An Indian who
is "off the reservation" is subject to the criminal laws of the state,
like any other citizen2 6 but within the reservation he is subject
only to federal and tribal jurisdiction. As was said in the case
of United States v. Boylan,27 which rejected a claim by courts of
the State of New York to jurisdiction over certain Indians for
acts committed on an Indian reservation, ". . . even a grant of
citizenship does not terminate the tribal status or relieve the Indian
from the guardianship of the government.1
2
The actual exercise of jurisdiction over criminal cases by
tribal courts and tribal councils has frequently been hampered by
the interference of Indian Bureau officials who disapproved of
the "uncivilized" practices of the Indians and sought to substitute
a "civilized" system of "courts of Indian offenses" in which the
superintendent of the reservation claimed the right to act as law-
maker, chief of police, prosecutor, witness, and court of appeal.
29
This allegedly "civilized" system of justice was in force on a num-
ber of reservations from 1884 until 1935,80 when it was super-
seded by a more liberal system which made the so-called Courts
of Indian Offenses responsible to the Indian tribes and terminated
the reservation superintendent's power to control proceedings in
these courts. A number of tribes, notably the Pueblos of the
Southwest, the Indians of New York, and, until the turn of the
centilry, the various tribes located in Indian Territory, never did
2'Worcester v. Georgia, (1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483;
United States v. Kagama, (1886) 118 U. S. 375, 6 Sup. Ct. 1109, 30 L. Ed.
228; United States v. Thomas, (1894) 151 U. S. 577, 14 Sup. Ct. 426, 38
L. Ed. 276; Toy v. Hopkins, (1909) 212 U. S. 542, 29 Sup. Ct. 416, 53
L. Ed. 644; United States v. Celestine, (1909) 215 U. S. 278, 30 Sup. Ct.
93, 54 L. Ed. 195; Donnelly v. United States, (1913) 228 U. S. 243, 33
Sup. Ct. 449, 27 L. Ed. 820; United States v. Pelican, (1914) 232 U. S. 442,
34 Sup. Ct. 396, 58 L. Ed. 676; United States v. Ramsey, (1926) 271 U. S.
467. 46 Sup. Ct. 559, 70 L. Ed. 1039; United States v. King, (E.D. Wis.
1897) 81 Fed. 625; In re Lincoln (N.D. Cal. 1904) 129 Fed. 247; United
States v. Hamilton, (W.D. N.Y. 1915) 233 Fed. 685; Yohyowan v. Luce,(E.D. Wash., 1923) 291 Fed. 425; State v. Campbell, (1893) 53 Minn. 354,
55 N. W. 553; State v. Big Sheep, (1926) 75 Mont. 219, 243 Pac. 1067; Ex
parte Cross, (1886) 20 Neb. 417, 30 N. W. 428; People ex rel. Cusick v.
Daly, (1914) 212 N. Y. 183, 105 N. E. 1048; State v. Cloud, (1930) 179
Minn. 180, 228 N. IV. 611; State v. Rufus, (1931) 205 Wis. 317, 237
N. v. 67.
'-'See Pablo v. People, (1896) 23 Colo. 134, 46 Pac. 636.
27(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1920) 265 Fed. 165.
-',See. to the same effect, Farrell v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1901) 110 Fed. 942; United States v. Nice, (1916) 241 U. S. 591, 36
Sup. Ct. 696, 60 L. Ed. 1192.
2 Regulations of the Indian Office (1904) secs. 584-591.
30Law and Order Regulations of the Indian Service, November 27,
1935, 55 I. D. 401.
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permit any encroachment by the federal authorities in the local
administration of justice, and enforced the criminal laws of the
tribe, written or unwritten, with an efficiency that has evoked a
good deal of admiration from impartial observers.
An opinion of the solicitor of the Interior Department ren-
dered in 193431 sums up the powers of an Indian tribe in the
administration of law and order in-the following terms:
"So long as the complete and independent sovereignty of an
Indian tribe was recognized, its criminal jurisdiction, no less than
its civil jurisdiction, was that of any sovereign power. It might
punish the subjects for offenses against each other or against
aliens and for public offenses against the peace and dignity of the
tribe. Similarly, it might punish aliens within its jurisdiction
according to its own laws and customs. Such jurisdiction con-
tinues to this day, save as it has been expressly limited by the
acts of a superior government.32
"Recognition of tribal authority in the administration of justice
is found in the statutes of Congress, as well as in the decisions of
the federal courts.
"U. S. Code, Title 25, section 229, provides that redress for a
civil injury committed by an Indian shall be sought in the first
instance from the 'Nation or tribe to which such Indian shall
belong.' This provision for collective responsibility evidently
assumes that the Indian tribe or Nation has its own resources for
exercising disciplinary power over individual wrongdoers within
the community.
"We have already referred to U. S. Code, Title 25, section
218, with its express assurance that persons 'punished by the law of
the tribe' shall not be tried again before the federal courts.
"What is even more important than these statutory recogni-
tions of tribal criminal authority is the persistent silence of
Congress on the general problem of Indian criminal jurisdiction.
There is nothing to justify an alternative to the conclusion that
the Indian tribes retain sovereignty and jurisdiction over a vast
area of ordinary offenses over which the federal government has
never presumed to legislate and over which the state governments
have not the authority to legislate.
"The attempts of the Interior Department to administer a
rough-and-ready sort of justice through Courts of Indian Offenses,
or directly through superintendents, cannot be held to have im-
paired tribal authority in the field of law and order. These
agencies have been characterized, in the only reported case squarely
upholding their legality, as 'mere educational and disciplinary in-
strumentalities by which the government of the United States is
31
"Powers of Indian Tribes" (October 25, 1934) 55 I. D. 14.
82At p. 57.
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endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition of these de-
pendent tribes to whom it sustains the relation of guardian.'
(United States v. Clapox, 35 Fed. 575; and cf. Ex parte Bi-a-lil-le,
12 Ariz. 150, 100 Pac. 450; United States v. Van Wert, 195 Fed.
974). Perhaps a more satisfactory defense of their legality is the
doctrine put forward by a recent writer that the Courts of Indian
Offenses 'derive their authority from the tribe, rather than from
Washington.' 33
"Whichever of these explanations be offered for the existence
of the Courts of Indian Offenses, their establishment cannot be
held to have destroyed or limited the powers vested by existing
law in the Indian tribes over the province of law and order and
the administration of civil and criminal justice."34
It remains to add that today the administration of law and
order is being taken over as a local responsibility by most of the
tribes that, since the enactment of the Wheeler-Howard Act of
June 18, 1934, have adopted constitutions for self-government. 35
The scope of the law and order problem which these tribes face is
measured by the lacunae of federal law. There is no federal law
to deal with simple assault committed by one Indian against an-
other on an Indian reservation, or with adultery, seduction, bigamy,
kidnapping, receiving stolen goods, obtaining money under false
pretenses, embezzlement, blackmail, libel, forgery, fraud, tres-
pass, mayhem, bribery, killing of another's livestock, setting fire
to grass or timber, use of false weights and measures, pollution
of water supplies or disorderly conduct. The list is by no means
complete. An Indian reservation would be a criminal's paradise
were it not for the preventive and punitive measures of the tribe
itself.
The penal codes thus far adopted by tribes which have organ-
ized under the Act of June 18, 1934, generally differ from com-
parable state penal codes in the following respects:
1-The number of offenses specified in a tribal code generally
runs between 40 and 50, whereas a state code (exclusive of local
municipal ordinances) generally specifies between 800 and 2,000
offenses.36
33Rice, The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the United
States, (1934) 16 3. Comp. Leg. (3d Ser.), Part 1, p. 78, 93.34At pp. 62, 64.
2-See, for example, Code of Ordinances of the Gila River Pima-Mari-
copa Indian Community, adopted June 3, 1936, and approved by the secre-
tary of the interior on August 24, 1936; Rosebud Code of Offenses,
adopted April 8, 1937, and approved by the secretary of the interior
July 7, 1937.
36The Penal Code of New York State (39 McKinney's Cons. Laws of
N.Y., 1936 supp.) lists fifty-four offenses under the letter "A". The Penal
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2-The maximum punishment specified in the Indian penal
codes is generally more humane, seldom exceeding imprisonment
for six months, even for offenses like kidnapping, for which state
penal codes impose imprisonment for twenty years or more, or
death.
3-Except for fixing a maximum penalty, the Indian penal
codes leave a large discretion to the court in adjusting the penalty
to the circumstances of the offense and the offender.
4-The form of punishment is, typically, forced labor for the
benefit of the tribe or of the victim of the offense, rather than
imprisonment.
5-The tribal penal codes, for the most part, do not contain
the usual catch-all provisions to be found in state penal codes
(vagrancy, conspiracy, criminal syndicalism, etc.), under which
almost any unpopular individual may be convicted of crime.
6-The tribal penal code is generally put into the hands of
every member of the tribe, and widely read and discussed, which
is not the case with state penal codes.
The comparison suggests that perhaps the Indian penal codes
may be more "civilized" than the non-Indian.
2. The Civil Jurisdiction of an Indian Tribe. The doctrine
of Indian tribal sovereignty was tested and confirmed in the field
of civil litigation in the case of Standley v. Roberts.3 7 The ques-
tion arose in this case whether a federal court might, by injunc-
tion, restrain the enforcement of a judgment rendered by the cir-
cuit court of the Choctaw Nation and confirmed by the Supreme
Court of the Choctaw Nation, affecting title to land and rights
to rentals within the Choctaw Nation. This issue was resolved
in favor of the Choctaw Nation by the circuit court of appeals, and
the decision was sustained by the Supreme Court. In the opinion
of the former court, rendered by judge Sanborn, it was said:
the judgments of the courts of those nations, in cases
within their jurisdiction, stand on the same footing with those of
the courts of the territories of the Union and are entitled to the
same faith and credit." 8
Commenting on the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction, an emi-
nent authority in this field writes:
"This gives to many Indian tribes a large measure of con-
Code of Montana (Montana, Rev. Codes 1921) contains 871 sections de-
fining crimes.
37See (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1894) 59 Fed. 836, app. dismissed, (1896)
17 Sup. Ct. 999, 41 L. Ed. 1177.
38 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1894) 59 Fed. 836, 845.
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tinuing autonomy, for the federal statutes are only a fragment of
law, principally providing some educational, hygienic and economic
assistance, regulating land ownership, and punishing certain crimes
committed by or upon Indians on a reservation. Where these
statutes do not reach, Indian custom is the only law. As a matter
of convenience, the regular courts (white men's courts) tacitly
assume that the general law of the community is the law in civil
cases between Indians, but these courts will apply Indian custom
where it is proved." 39
Application of tribal law to questions of contract and property
rights as well as to personal relations, has been sustained con-
sistently by the federal courts.4"
In view of a fairly prevalent notion that the conferring of
United States citizenship upon Indians loosens the force of tribal
laws, it is well to point out that the only legal authority for this
view to be found in the federal cases-the decision of the Supreme
Court in In re Heff41-has since been explicitly repudiated. 42
The fallacy of the argument that citizenship is incompatible with
tribal jurisdiction is exposed in an opinion of the attorney general, 43
holding that the Choctaw courts had complete jurisdiction over a
civil controversy between a Choctaw Indian and an adopted white
man. The opinion states:
"On the other hand, it is argued by the United States Agent,
that the courts of the Choctaws can have no jurisdiction of any
case in which a citizen of the United States is a party ...
"In the first place, it is certain that the Agent errs in assum-
ing the legal impossibility of a citizen of the United States be-
coming subject, in civil matters, or criminal either, to the juridic-
tion of the Choctaws. It is true that no citizen of the United
States can, while he remains within the United States, escape
their constitutional jurisdiction, either by adoption into a tribe of
Indians, or in any other way. But the error in all this consists
in the idea that any man, citizen or not citizen, becomes divested
of his allegiance to the United States, or throws off their juris-
diction or government, in the fact of becoming subject to any
3DRice, The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the United
States, (1934) 16 J. Comp. Leg. (3d series), part 1, at p. 90.40Crabtree v. Madden, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 54 Fed. 426; Jones v.
Laney, (1847) 2 Tex. 342, 21 S. W. 297: Delaware Indians v. Cherokee
Nation, (1903) 38 Ct. of Cl. 234, decree modified (1904) 193 U. S. 127,
24 Sup. Ct. 342, 48 L. Ed. 646; Myers v. Mathis (1898) 2 Ind. T. 3, 46
S. W. 178; James H. Hamilton v. United States, (1907) 42 Ct. of C1.
282; Zevely v. Weimer, (1904) 5 Ind. T. 646, 82 S. W. 941, and see
Pound, Nationals Without a Nation, (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 97, 101-102.41(1905) 197 U. S. 488, 25 Sup. Ct. 506, 49 L. Ed. 848.42See United States v. Nice, (1916) 241 U. S. 591, 601, 36 Sup. Ct. 696,
60 L. Ed. 1192.43(1855) 7 Op. Att. Gen. 176.
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local jurisdiction whatever. This idea misconceives entirely the
whole theory of the federal government, which theory is, that all
the inhabitants of the country are, in regard to certain limited
matters, subject to the federal jurisdiction, and in all others to
the local jurisdiction, whether political or municipal. The citizen
of Mississippi is also a citizen of the United States; and he owes
allegiance to, and is subject to the laws of, both governments. So
also an Indian, whether he be Choctaw or Chickasaw, and while
subject to the local jurisdiction of the councils and courts of the
Nation, yet is not in any possible relation or sense divested of his
allegiance and obligations to the Government and laws of the
United States."
3. The Indian Tribes and the Federal Constitution. The doc-
trine of tribal autonomy first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall
was put to a decisive test in the case of Talton v. Mayes.44 Under
the legal doctrine of tribal autonomy, the powers of an Indian tribe,
not being derived from treaties of the United States nor from stat-
utes enacted by Congress, are not subject to the limitations which
the United States Constitution imposes upon the federal govern-
ment. It follows that Indian courts and legislatures may proceed
without reference to the many restrictions of substance and proce-
dure which the federal courts have discovered in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, for it has long been held that this
clause applies only to agencies of the United States and does not
give any specific protection against oppressive acts of states, munic-
ipalities, mobs, private corporations, religious orders, or voluntary
associations.
45
The case of Talton v. Mayes turned on the question whether the
conviction of a murderer in a tribal court was lacking in "due
process" for the reason that the person convicted had not been
indicted by a grand jury in the usual manner of common law
courts. The opinion of the Supreme Court delivered by Mr.
Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) White, met the question square-
ly:
"The case in this regard therefore depends upon whether the
powers of local government exercised by the Cherokee nation are
federal powers created by and springing from the Constitution of
the United States, and hence controlled by the fifth amendment to
that constitution, or whether they are local powers not created by
the constitution, although subject to its general provisions and the
paramount authority of Congress. The repeated adjudications of
44(1896) 163 U. S. 376, 16 Sup. Ct. 986, 41 L. Ed. 196.
45See United States v. Wheeler, (1920) 254 U. S. 281, 41 Sup. Ct.
133, 65 L. Ed. 270, and cases therein cited.
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this court have long since answered the former question in the
negative."40o
After quoting from Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,
and other authorities, the Court declared:
"True it is that in many adjudications of this court the fact
has been fully recognized, that although possessed of these attri-
butes of local self government, when exercising their tribal
functions, all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative
authority of the United States. Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Rail-
way Co., 135 U. S. 641, where the cases are fully reviewed. But
the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner in
which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exercised
does not render such local powers federal powers arising from and
created by the constitution of the United States. It follows that
as the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee
nation existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated
upon by the fifth amendment, which, as we have said, had for its
sole object to control the powers conferred by the Constitution
on the national government."
4 7
The decision in Talton v. Mayes does not mean that Indian
tribes are not subject to the constitution of the United States.
It remains true that an Indian tribe is subject to the federal con-
stitution in the same sense that the City of New Orleans, for in-
stance, is subject to the federal constitution. The federal consti-
tution prohibits slavery absolutely. This absolute prohibition
applies to an Indian tribe as well as to a municipal government,
and it has been held that slave-holding within an Indian tribe be-
came illegal with the passage of the thirteenth amendment.48 It is,
therefore, always pertinent to ask whether an ordinance of a tribe
conflicts with the constitution of the United States.49  Where,
however, the United States constitution levies particular restraints
upon federal courts or upon Congress, these restraints do not
apply to the courts or legislatures of the Indian tribes. Likewise,
where the federal constitution lays particular restraints upon the
states, these restraints are inapplicable to Indian tribes.
It has been held that the guarantee of religious liberty in the
first amendment of the United States constitution does not protect
a resident of New Orleans from religious oppression by municipal
authorities." Neither does it protect the Indian against religious
-IAt p. 382.
17At p. 384. See, to the same effect, Ex parte Tiger, (1898) 2 Ind.
T. 41, 47 S. W. 304.
48in re Sah Quab, (D.C. Alaska 1886) 31 Fed. 327.
4OCf. Roff v. Burney, (1897) 168 U. S. 218, 18 Sup. Ct. 60, 42 L. Ed. 442.
5OPermoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, (1845)
3 How. (U.S.) 589, 11 L. Ed. 739.
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oppression on the part of tribal authorities. As the citizen of New
Orleans must write guarantees of religious liberty into his city
charter or his state constitution, if he desires constitutional protec-
tion in this respect, so the members of an Indian tribe must write
the guarantees they desire into tribal constitutions. In fact, many
tribes have written such guarantees into tribal constitutions that
are now in force.5 1
4. The Membership of an Indian Tribe. The principle of
tribal autonomy implies that questions of membership in an
Indian tribe are to be determined in accordance with the laws
and customs of the tribe itself, at least wherever Congress has
not modified or superseded these laws and customs by special
legislation. The authority of an Indian tribe to decide such ques-
tions has been challenged from several sources. On the one hand,
individuals have claimed tribal membership on the basis of a
supposed common law principle to the effect that the child as-
sumes the status of the father. This claim has generally been put
forward by individuals with a slight degree of Indian blood who
discover that they are Indians when oil is struck in some ancestral
homeland. Again the authority of tribal laws and customs has
been challenged by departmental officials who felt that questions
of membership in an Indian tribe should be determined by rules
and regulations of the secretary of the interior.
The case of Waldron v. United States,5 2 is perhaps the clearest
of the cases in which the validity of Indian laws and customs on
51A typical Indian bill of rights is the following, taken from the con-
stitution of the Blackfeet Tribe, approved Dec. 13, 1935 by the secretary
of the interior, pursuant to section 16 of the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat.
at L. 964) :
"ARTICLE VIII-BILL OF RIGHTS
"Section 1. Suffrage.-Any member of the Blackfeet Tribe, twenty-one
(21) years of age or over, shall be eligible to vote at any election when he
or she presents himself or herself at a polling place within his or her voting
district.
"Section 2. Economic rights.--All members of the tribe shall be ac-
corded equal opportunities to participate in the economic resources and
activities of the reservation.
"Section 3. Civil liberties.-All members of the tribe may enjoy with-
out hindrance freedom of worship, conscience, speech, press, assembly, and
association.
"Section 4. Rights of accused.-Any member of the Blackfeet Tribe
accused of any offense shall have the right to a bond, open and public
hearing, with due notice of the offense charged, and shall be permitted to
summon witnesses on his own behalf. Trial by jury may be demanded
by any prisoner accused of any offense punishable by more than thirty
days' imprisonment. Excessive bail shall not be required and cruel
punishment shall not be imposed."
52(C.C. S.D. 1905) 143 Fed. 413.
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questions of tribal membership is considered and upheld. The
plaintiff in this case, Jane Valdron, had been recognized by the
Two Kettle Band of the Sioux Nation, in accordance with its
laws and customs, as a member of the Band.
The secretary of the interior asked the attorney general to
render an opinion on the plaintiff's status, and the attorney
general held that whether the plaintiff was entitled to an allot-
ment as an Indian depended on the laws and customs of the tribe:
"The question, therefore, whether any particular person is or
is not an Indian within the meaning of this agreement is to be
determined, in my opinion, not by the common law, but by the
laws or usages of the tribe.
5 3
The secretary of the interior, having received this opinion,
like many honorable administrative officials before and since,
found it to be an inconvenient limitation upon his discretion, and
failed to carry it out. In disregard of the laws and usages of the
Two Kettle Band of the Sioux Nation, the secretary of the in-
terior refused an allotment to Jane "Waldron, who then brought
suit against the United States to secure her allotment, under the
act of February 6, 1901.5 4 The United States circuit court for
South Dakota agreed with the attorney general as to the law, and
awarded the allotment in question to the plaintiff, holding that,
since she was recognized by the tribe as a member, the secretary
of the interior had no authority to over-rule the tribal decision
and exclude her from membership privileges. The Court went
on to say:
"In this proceeding the court has been informed as to the
usages and customs of the different tribes of the Sioux Nation,
and has found as a fact that the common law does not obtain
among said tribes, as to determining the race to which the chil-
dren of a white man, married to an Indian woman, belong; but,
that, according to the usages and customs of said tribes, the chil-
dren of a white man, married to an Indian woman, take the race
or nationality of the mother."55
This doctrine is confirmed by a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions on tribal membership in which reference is had to the law,
;3(1894) 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 711, 712. To the same effect see: United
States v. Heyfron, (two cases), (C.C. Mont. 1905) 138 Fed. 964, 968;
Western Cherokee Indians v. United States, (1891) 27 Ct. Cl. 1; (1888)
19 Op. Atty. Gen. 109.
5431 St. at L. 760; U. S. C., Title 25, secs. 345-346, 25 U. S. C. A.
secs. 345-46.
"At p. 419.
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customs, and decisions of the Indian tribe in determining the right
of an individual to membership in the tribe.56
Indeed, the federal cases go so far in the recognition of tribal
autonomy as to hold that the federal courts themselves may be
ousted of jurisdiction where tribal law provides that an inter-
married white becomes a member of the tribe and subject to the
jurisdiction of the tribe. In the case of Raymond v. Raymwnd,5'
the court, following the authority of Nofire v. United States, above
cited, upheld the jurisdiction of a tribal court over a divorce action,
declaring:
"It is conceded that under the laws of that nation the appellee
became a member of that tribe, by adoption, through her inter-
marriage with the appellant. It is settled by the decisions of the
supreme court that her adoption into that nation ousted the
federal court of jurisdiction over any suit between her and any
member of that tribe, and vested the tribal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over every such action."- 8
Probably the most carefully reasoned opinion on the right of
an Indian tribe to determine questions of tribal membership is the
opinion of the New York court of appeals in the case of Patterson
v. Council of Seneca Nation.5 9 This was a case where the plaintiff
sought by mandamus to compel the Council of the Seneca Nation
to recognize him as a member of that Nation. The court of
appeals, after a careful examination of the authorities, held that
mandamus would not lie for the reason that the authority of the
Seneca Council was not derived from legislation of the state or
nation but antedated both and was beyond interference from state
courts. In reaching this conclusion, the Court, referring to the
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, de-
clared, per Kellogg, J.:
"Unless these expressions as well as similar expressions many
times used by many courts in various jurisdictions, are mere
words of flattery designed to soothe Indian sensibilities, unless the
last vestige of separate national life has been withdrawn from the
Indian tribes by encroaching state legislation, then, surely, it
must follow that the Seneca Nation of Indians has retained for
itself that prerequisite to their self-preservation and integrity as a
nation, the right to determine by whom its membership shall be
constituted." 60
56Nofire v. United States, (1897) 164 U. S. 647, 17 Sup. Ct. 212, 41
L. Ed. 588; Hy-yu-tse-mil-kin v. Smith, (1904) 194 U. S. 401, 24 Sup.
Ct. 676. 48 L. Ed. 1039; Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, (1906) 203 U. S.
76, 27 Sup. Ct. 29, 51 L. Ed. 96.
57(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1897) 83 Fed. 721.58At p. 723.
59(1927) 245 N. Y. 433, 157 N. E. 734.
OflAt p. 438.
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"It must be the law, therefore, that, unless the Seneca Nation
of Indians and the state of New York enjoy a relation inter se
peculiar to themselves, the right to enrollment of the petitioner,
with its attending property rights, depends upon the laws and
usages of the Seneca Nation and is to be determined by that
Nation for itself without interference or dictation from the
supreme court of the state." 6'
"The conclusion is inescapable that the Seneca Tribe remains
a separate nation; that its powers of self-government are retained
with the sanction of the state; that the ancient customs and usages
of the nation except in a few particulars, remain, unabolished, the
law of the Indian land; that in its capacity of a sovereign nation
the Seneca Nation is not subservient to the orders and directions
of the courts of New York state; that, above all, the Seneca
Nation retains for itself the power of determining who are Senecas,
and in that respect is above interference and dictation. 62
The general power of an Indian tribe to determine its own
membership is limited only by Congressional enactments which
grant property rights associated with tribal membership to speci-
fied classes of individuals 63 or which empower the secretary of
the interior to establish final rolls for designated tribes.
Such statutes, generally speaking, do not destroy the power
of the tribe to determine its own membership, although they take
from that power some of its pecuniary importance by allowing
persons whom the tribe does not recognize as members to receive
shares of tribal property and by allowing the secretary of the
interior to deny a share of such property to others whom the tribe
does recognize. This latter issue was presented to the Supreme
Court in the case of United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock,"'
where the secretary of the interior refused an allotment to an indi-
vidual who claimed to have been adopted by the tribe. The secre-
tary was upheld, and the Court declared, per Holmes, J.:
"If the secretary had authority to pass on the relator's right
to select land, his jurisdiction did not depend upon his decision
being right."'65
Dicta in this case suggest that the action of the tribe in
6lAt p. 440.
62At p. 445.
0 3See Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. at L. 90, U. S. C., Title 25, sec.
184. 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 184 (right of children born of marriages between
white men and Indian women) ; Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. at L. 420;
U. S. C., Title 43, sec. 189, 43 U. S. C. A. sec. 189 (public lands), (Indians
abandoning tribal relations). Cf. Oakes v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1909) 172 Fed. 305.
-3(1907) 205 U. S. 80, 27 Sup. Ct. 423, 51 L. Ed. 718.
crAt p. 85.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
adopting members was subject to some sort of review by the De-
partment of the Interior. Such dicta would be entitled to greater
weight if the court had not hastened to add that "it hardly is
necessary to pass upon that point." It is fair, therefore, to
conclude that on issues of the sort presented by the case of United
States e.x" rel. West v. Hitchcock, involving the disposition of
property by the secretary of the interior under special legislation
authorizing such disposition, the secretary of the interior does
have power to disregard a tribal decision on membership. Except
in this situation, the tribal decision would seem to be final. This
interpretation of the cases is confirmed by a recent opinion of the
Interior Department."'
The written constitutions of tribes which have organized under
the act of June 18, 1934, contain provisions on membership which
vary considerably from tribe to tribe. Generally these constitu-
tions provide that descendants of two parents, both of whom are
members of the tribe, shall be deemed members of the tribe.
With respect to the offspring of mixed marriages, constitutions
differ. Some make the membership of such offspring depend
upon whether his degree of Indian blood is more than one half or
one quarter. Others make the membership of such offspring de-
pend upon whether its parents maintain a residence on the reser-
vation. Nearly all tribal constitutions provide for adoption
through special action by the tribe, subject to review by the sec-
retary of the interior. The general trend of the tribal enactments
on membership is away from the older notion that rights of tribal
membership run with Indian blood, no matter how dilute the
stream. Instead it is recognized that membership in a tribe is a
political relation rather than a racial attribute. Those who no
longer take part in tribal affairs, who do not live upon the reserva-
tion, who marry non-Indians, may retain their claims upon tribal
property, but most Indian tribes now deny such individuals the
opportunity to claim a share of tribal assets for each child pro-
duced. The trend is toward making participation in tribal prop-
erty correlative with the obligations that fall upon the members of
the Indian community.
5. Tribal Regulation of Inheritance. The doctrine of tribal
self-government implies that where Congress is silent the descent
and distribution of Indian property will be governed by the
customs or ordinances of the Indian tribes.
66See (1934) 55 I. D. 14, 39-40.
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The leading case in which this proposition was tested is the
case of Jones v. Meehan."- Land had been allotted to Chief Moose
Dung. After his death, the chief's eldest son, Moose Dung the
Younger, leased the land in 1891 for ten years, to two white men,
the plaintiffs, on the assumption that he was, by the custom of his
tribe, the sole heir to the property and entitled, in his own right,
to dispose of it. Thereafter, in 1894, a second lease of the same
land was executed in favor of another white man, the defendant.
The secretary of the interior took the view that the earlier
lease was invalid. The secretary of the interior approved the
second lease, pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress specifically
authorizing the approval of the second lease. Under the second
lease, the secretary of the interior held, the rentals were to be
divided among six descendants of the older Chief Moose Dung,
and Moose Dung the Younger was to receive only a one-sixth
share. Thus the Supreme Court was faced with a clear question:
Did Moose Dung the Younger have the right, in 1891, to make
a valid lease which neither the secretary of the interior nor Con-
gress itself could thereafter annul? Faced with this question,
the Court declared, per Gray, J.:
"The Department of the Interior appears to have assumed
that, upon the death of Moose Dung the elder, in 1872, the title
in his land descended by law to his heirs general, and not to his
eldest son only.
"But the elder Chief Moose Dung being a member of an Indian
tribe, whose tribal organization was still recognized by the govern-
ment of the United States, the right of inheritance in his land,
at the time of his death, was controlled by the laws, usages and
customs of the tribe, and not by the law of the state of Minnesota,
nor by any action of the secretary of the interior. ' '6s
"The title to the strip of land in controversy, having been
granted by the United States to the elder Chief Moose Dung by
the treaty itself, and having descended, upon his death, by the
laws, customs and usages of the tribe, to his eldest son and suc-
cessor as chief, Moose Dung the Younger, passed by the lease
executed by the latter in 1891 to the plaintiffs for the term of that
lease; and their rights under that lease could not be divested by
any subsequent action of the lessor, or of Congress, or of the
executive departments."' 6 9
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Jones v. Meehan cites a
long series of cases in federal and state courts which likewise
67(1899) 175 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 1, 44 L. Ed. 495.
O8At. p. 29.
6DAt p. 32.
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uphold the validity of tribal laws and customs of inheritance.7 1
The upshot of the cases cited is summarized in the words of a
New York court: "When Congress does not act no law runs on an
Indian reservation save the Indian tribal law and custom." 71
The decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v. Meehan is a
clear refutation of the theory that in the absence of law plenary
power over Indian affairs rests with the Interior Department.
The case holds not only that power over inheritance, in the absence
of Congressional legislation, rests with the Indian tribe, but that
Congress itself cannot disturb rights which have vested under
tribal law and custom.
The holding of the Supreme Court in Jones v. Meehan has
never been questioned,7 2 but the scope of that decision has been
limited on allotted reservations by special statutes governing the
probate of wills and the inheritance of real property.
The General Allotment Act of February 8, 188713 provides:
"The law of descent and partition in force in the state or ter-
ritory where such lands are situate shall apply thereto after patents
therefor have been executed and delivered, except as herein or
otherwise provided."
Under section 1 of the Act of June 25, 19107' the secretary
of the interior is empowered to determine the legal heirs of Indian
allottees, and it is declared that his decision thereon shall be "final
and conclusive." The same act of June 25, 1910, gives the com-
missioner of Indian affairs and the secretary of the interior abso-
lute power to approve or disapprove Indians' wills devising allotted
land.
Under this legislation a large part of the tribal jurisdiction
with respect to inheritance has been transferred, so far as the
allotted reservations are concerned, to the state legislatures and
to the Interior Department.
7oUnited States v. Shanks, (1870) 15 Minn. 369; Dole v. Irish (1848)
2 Barb. N. Y. 639; Hastings v. Farmer (1850) 4 N. Y. 293, 294; The
Kansas Indians, (1866) 5 Wall. (U. S.) 737, 18 L. Ed. 667; Waupemanqua
v. Aldrich (C.C.D. Ind. 1886) (28 Fed. 489) ; Brown v. Steele (1880) 23
Kan. 473; Richardville v. Thorp (C.C. Kan. 1886) 28 Fed. 52.
7'Woodin v. Seeley, (1931) 141 Misc. Rep. 207, 252 N. Y. S. 818.
720Other cases which support or follow the decision in Jones v. Meehan
are: Mackey v. Coxe, (1855) 18 How. (U.S.) 100, 315 L. Ed. 299; Gray v.
Coffman, (C.C. Kan. 1874) 3 Dill. 393, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,714; Meeker v.
Kaelin, (C.C. Wash. 1909) 173 Fed. 216; Y-Ta-Tah-Wah v. Rebock, (C.C.
Ia. 1900) 105 Fed. 257; O'Brien v. Bugbee, (1891) 46 Kan. 1, 26 Pac. 428;
Oklahoma Land Co. v. Thomas, (1912) 34 Okla. 681, 127 Pac. 8; Butler
v. Wilson, (1915) 54 Okla. 229, 153 Pac. 823; George v. Pierce, (1914)
85 Misc. Rep. 105, 148 N. Y. S. 230.
7324 Stat. at L. 389; U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 348, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 348.
7436 Stat. at L. 855; U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 372, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 372.
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Even on these reservations, however, wills of personal prop-
erty are subject to the jurisdiction of the tribe. On reservations
which have never been allotted, all inheritance of property remains
subject to tribal jurisdiction, under the decision of the Supreme
Court in Jones v. Meehan.71
6. The Taxing Power of an Indian Tribe. One of the powers
essential to the maintenance of any government is the power to
levy taxes. That this power is an inherent attribute of tribal sov-
ereignty which continues unless withdrawn or limited by treaty
or by act of Congress is a proposition which has never been suc-
cessfully disputed.
A landmark in this field is the case of Buster and Jones v.
Wright.70  The Creek Nation, one of the Five Civilized Tribes,
had imposed a tax or license fee upon all persons, not citizens of
the Creek Nation, who traded within the borders of that Nation.
The Interior Department sought the advice of the attorney general
as to the legality of this tax, and was advised that the tax was
legal and that the Interior Department was under an implied duty
to assist in its enforcement.77  Thereupon the Interior Depart-
ment promulgated appropriate regulations to assist the tribe in
making collections of license fees. The plaintiffs in the case of
Buster and Jones v. Wright were traders doing business on town
sites within the boundaries of the Creek Nation, who sought to
enjoin officers of the Creek Nation and of the Interior Department
from dosing down their business and ousting them for non-pay-
7-See (1934) 55 I. D. 14, 43.
76(C.C.A. Sth Cir. 1905) 135 Fed. 947, app. dism., (1906) 203 U. S.
599, 27 Sup. Ct. 777, 51 L. Ed. 334.
77"The treaties and laws of the United States make all persons, with a
few specified exceptions, who are not citizens of an Indian nation or mem-
bers of an Indian tribe, and are found within an Indian nation without per-
mission, intruders there, and require their removal by the United States.
This closes the whole matter, absolutely excludes all but the excepted
classes, and fully authorizes these nations to absolutely exclude outsiders, or
to permit their residence or business upon such terms as they may choose
to impose, and it must be borne in mind that citizens of the United States
have, as such, no more right or business to be there than they have in
any foreign nation, and can lawfully be there at all only by Indian per-
mission; and that their right to be or remain or carry on business there
depends solely upon whether they have such permission.
"As to the power or duty of your department in the premises there can
hardly be a doubt. Under the treaties of the United States with these
Indian nations this government is under the most solemn obligation, and
for which it has received ample consideration, to remove and keep removed
from the territory of these tribes, all this class of intruders who are there
without Indian permission. The performance of this obligation, as in other
matters concerning the Indians and their affairs, has long been devolved
upon the Department of the Interior. . . ." Trespassers on Indian Lands,
(1900) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 214, 217-218.
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ment of taxes. On demurrer, the plaintiffs' bill was dismissed by
the trial court. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by
the court of appeals of the Indian Territory,78 again by the circuit
court of appeals for the eighth circuit,79 and finally by the United
States Supreme Court. 0 The learned opinion of Judge Sanborn
in the circuit court of appeals illuminates the entire subject:
"The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the terms
upon which noncitizens may transact business within its borders
did not have its origin in act of Congress, treaty, or agreement
of the United States. It was one of the inherent and essential
attributes of its original sovereignty. It was a natural right of
that people, indispensable to its autonomy as a distinct tribe or
nation, and it must remain an attribute of its government until
by the agreement of the nation itself or by the superior power of
the republic it is taken from it. Neither the authority nor the
power of the United States to license its citizens to trade in the
Creek Nation, with or without the consent of that tribe, is in issue
in this case, because the complainants have no such licenses. The
plenary power and lawful authority of the government of the
United States by license, by treaty, or by act of Congress to take
from the Creek Nation every vestige of its original or acquired
governmental authority and power may be admitted, and for the
purposes of this decision are here conceded. The fact remains
nevertheless that every original attribute of .the government of the
Creek Nation still exists intact which has not been destroyed or
limited by act of Congress or by the contracts of the Creek tribe
itself.
".... It is said that the sale of these lots and the incorporation
of cities and towns upon the sites in which the lots are found
authorized by act of Congress to collect taxes for municipal pur-
poses segregated the town sites and the lots sold from the territory
of the Creek Nation, and deprived it of governmental jurisdiction
over this property and over its occupants. But the jurisdiction to
govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited
by the title to the land which they occupy in it, or by the existence
of municipalities therein endowed with power to collect taxes
for city purposes, and to enact and enforce municipal ordinances.
Neither the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty
loses the power to govern the people within its borders by the
existence of towns and cities therein endowed with the usual
powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy of
the land within its territorial jurisdiction by citizens or for-
eigners." 8'
M*Buster and Jones v. Wright, (1904) 5 I. T. 404, 82 S. W. 855.
79(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 135 Fed. 947.80(1906) 203 U. S. 599, 27 Sup. Ct. 777, 51 L. Ed. 334, dismissed
without opinion.
slAt pp. 949-952.
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The case of Buster and Jones v. Wright dealt with what may
be called a license or privilege tax, but the principles therein af-
firmed are equally applicable to a tax on property. Such a tax
was upheld in Morris v. Hitchcock. 2 This case dealt with a tax
levied by the Chickasaw Nation on cattle owned by non-citizens of
that Nation and grazed on private land within the national boun-
daries. The opinion of the United States court of appeals for the
District of Columbia declares:
"A government of the kind necessarily has the power to main-
tain its existence and effectiveness through the exercise of the
usual power of taxation upon all property within its limits, save
as may be restricted by its organic law. Any restriction in the
organic law in respect of this ordinary power of taxation, and the
property subject thereto, ought to appear by express provision
or necessary implication. Board Trustees v. Indiana, 14 How.
268, 272; Talbott v. Silver Bow Co., 139 U. S. 438, 448. Where
the restriction upon this exercise of power by a recognized govern-
ment, is claimed under the stipulations of -a treaty with another,
whether the former be dependent upon the latter or not, it would
seem that its existence ought to appear beyond a reasonable doubt.
We discover no such restriction in the clause of Article 7 of the
Treaty of 1855, which excepts white persons from the recognition
therein of the unrestricted right of self-government by the Chicka-
saw Nation, and its full jurisdiction over persons and property
within its limits. The conditions of that exception may be fully met
without going to the extreme of saying that it was also intended
to prevent the exercise of the power to consent to the entry of
non-citizens, or the taxation of property actually within the
limits of that government and enjoying its benefits.18 3
The power to tax does not depend upon the power to remove
and has been upheld where there was no power in the tribe to
,remove the taxpayer from the tribal jurisdiction.84 Where, how-
ever, the tribe does have power to remove a person from its juris-
diction, it may impose conditions upon his remaining within tribal
territory, including the condition of paying license fees. An opinion
of the attorney general dated September 17, 1900, quoted with
approval in Morris v. Hitchcock,s5 declares:
"Under the treaties with the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians,
82(1903) 21 App. D. C. 565, aff'd (1904) 194 U. S. 374, 24 Sup. Ct. 712,
48 L. Ed. 1030.7At. p. 593. Other authorities supporting the power of an Indian
tribe to levy taxes or license fees are: Crabtree v. Madden, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1893) 54 Fed. 426; Maxey v. Wright, (1900) 3 Ind. T. 243, 54
S. W. 807, aff'd (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1900) 105 Fed. 1003; (1884) 18 Op. Att.
Gen. 34, 36; (1900) 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 219. 220, 528.84Buster and Jones v. Wright, (1904) 5 I. T. 404, 82 S. W. 855.
sr(1904) 194 U. S. 384, 391, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. Ed. 1030.
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no person not a citizen or member of a tribe, or belonging to the
exempted classes, can be lawfully within the limits of the country
occupied by these tribes without their permission, and they have
the right to impose the terms upon which such permission will be
granted."
It is therefore pertinent in analyzing the scope of tribal taxing
powers, to inquire how far an Indian tribe is empowered to re-
move non-members from its reservation. This question is the
more important today because statutes authorizing the commis-
sioner of Indian affairs to remove "undesirable" persons from
Indian country were repealed, at the urging of the present ad-
ministration, in the interests of civil liberty.86 Because of its
peculiar jurisdictional status an Indian reservation is sometimes
infested with white criminals or simple trespassers, and the prob-
lem of what effective legal action can be taken by a tribe to remove
such persons from its reservation is a serious one.
The law as to the power of a tribe to exclude nonmembers from
its territory is clearly stated in a series of authorities running back
to the earliest days of the Republic. We find in the first volume
of the Opinions of the Attorney General the following answer to
a question raised by the secretary of war as to the right of the
Seneca Nation to exclude trespassers from its lands:
"So long as a tribe exists and remains in possession of its lands,
its title and possession are sovereign and exclusive; and there
exists no authority to enter upon their lands, for any purpose
whatever, without their consent."8
The present state of the law on the power to remove non-
members is thus summarized in the solicitor's opinion of October
25, 1934, on "Powers of Indian Tribes :"
"Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as
well as the rights of a local government, dominion as well as
sovereignty. But over all the lands of the reservation, whether
owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe
has the sovereign power of determining the conditions upon which
persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside therein,
and to do business, provided only such determination is consistent
with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any vested
rights of persons now occupying reservation lands under lawful
authority.""8
7. The Legal Status of Tribal Property. The proposition
8GAct of May 21, 1934, 48 Stat. at L. 787 repealing U. S. C., Title 25,
sees. 220, 221, 222, and related statutory provisions.87(1821) 1 Ops. Atty. Gen. 303.
88(1934) 55 I. D. 14, 50, citing Morris v. Hitchcock, (1904) 194
U. S. 384, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. Ed. 1030, and other cases.
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that tribal property belongs to the Indian tribes is so plain and self-
evident that it would not be worth discussion but for the fact
that Congress and the executive occasionally have treated Indian
tribal property as if it were a part of the public domain of the
federal government. Thus Congress has provided for the issuance
of mineral leases by the secretary of the interior upon unallotted
tribal lands, in nine specified states, 9 for the sale of timber on
tribal lands by the secretary of the interior,90 and for the aliena-
tion of tribal land to individual Indians,91 all without reference
to the wishes of the tribe. When members of the Kiowa, Co-
manche and Apache Tribes attempted to stop the process of
allotting the tribal domain as an unconstitutional infringement of
tribal ownership rights guaranteed by treaty, the Supreme Court
dismissed the suit on the ground that Congress had plenary power
to manage Indian tribal property for the benefit of the Indians,
and that the decision of Congress as to what was beneficial for
the Indians would not be overthrown.92
Granted, however, that Congress has a very broad power to
manage tribal property, a power even broader, apparently than its
power over the property of individual Indians,93 there remains
the important question: Where Congress has not acted to divest
the tribe of its powers, what powers may a tribe exercise over
tribal property?
This question has become increasingly important as the ten-
dency of Congress to disregard the Indian tribes in managing and
disposing of tribal property has been abandoned during the past
six years. It is noteworthy that each of the three principal
statutes, above cited, authorizing the secretary of the interior to
dispose of Indian tribal property without reference to the wishes
of the Indians, has been modified within the past six years. The
power of the secretary to allot tribal lands was revoked by sec-
tion 1 of the Act of June 18, 193404 as to all tribes not excluded
"OSection 26 of the Act of June 30, 1919; 41 Stat. at L. 31 ; 25 U. S. C.,
sec. 399, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 399.OoSection 7 of the Act of June 25, 1910; 36 Stat. at L. 857; 25 U. S. C.,
sec. 407, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 407.OlGeneral Allotment Act of 1887; 24 Stat. at L. 388, 25 U. S. C., sec.
331-334, 339-341, 342, 348, 349, 25 U. S. C. A. secs. 331-334, 339-341, 342,
348, 349.
02Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, (1903) 187 U. S. 553, 23 Sup. Ct. 216,
47 L. Ed. 299.92See Choate v. Trapp, (1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56
L. Ed. 941.
0448 Stat. at L. 984, 25 U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 461, 25 U. S. C. A.
see. 461.
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from that act. All tribes enjoying the advantages of that act are
empowered to adopt constitutions which will
"prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent
of the tribe."95
Even tribes not under the Act of June 18, 1934, are protected,
with respect to mineral leases, by the Act of May 11, 1938, which
supersedes the earlier law, and provides that mineral leases on
tribal land may be issued only
"by authority of the tribal council or other authorized spokesmen
for such Indians." 96
Equally significant is the fact that during the past three sessions
of Congress all bills attempting to dispose of tribal land without
the consent of the tribe were defeated.9 7
Recognizing, then, that Congress no longer seeks to prevent
the Indian tribes from acting with respect to their tribal property,
the question of what a tribe may do with tribal property has a
practical as well as a theoretical importance.
The case of Cherokee Nation v. Journeycakes is perhaps the
leading case which analyzes the respective rights of the Indian
tribe and the individual member in tribal property. The case
arose out of an agreement between the Cherokee Nation and the
Delawares under which the Delawares were admitted to member-
ship and guaranteed equal rights with other citizens of the Chero-
kee Nation. Later the Cherokee National Council enacted a dis-
criminatory bill, over the veto of Principal Chief Bushyhead, which
allocated proceeds of tribal grazing leases to native-born Chero-
kees but not to those of Delaware origin. The controversy over
the claim of the Delawares to equal participation in Cherokee
funds and lands was referred by Congress to the Court of Claims,
which upheld the Delaware claim. This decision was affirmed
by the Supreme Court. The opinion of Brewer, J., quoted with
approval the opinion of the Court of Claims to the effect that
"powers of absolute ownership" were "lodged in the Cherokee
government," declared that individual members of the tribe held
95Act of June 18, 1834, sec. 16; 48 Stat. at L. 986, U. S. C., Title 25,
sec. 476, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 476.96The areas excepted from this protection by sec. 6 of the act of
May 11, 1938 (52 Stat. at L. 348, U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 396f, 25 U. S. C. A.
sec. 396f) are covered by separate legislation.97Thus, for example, various bills which attempted to transfer certain
tribal lands of the Pyramid Lake Tribe to non-Indians without tribal con-
sent failed of passage. (S. 3908, H.R. 11571, 74th Congress, 2d sess.; S. 840,
75th Congress, 1st sess.)
98(1894) 155 U. S. 196, 15 Sup. Ct. 39 L. Ed. 120.
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interests "limited to a mere occupancy of the tracts set apart for
homes, with the right to free use in common of the unoccupied
portion of the reserve, and a right to share in any future allot-
ment," and concluded, upon the basis of Chief Bushyhead's veto
message, that the Cherokee Nation had granted to its adopted
citizens an equity in tribal property of which, under the Cherokee
Constitution, they could not be deprived. 9
Except for such rights as are thus conferred upon individual
membership, ownership of tribal property, legal or equitable, rests
in the tribe as an entity, rather than in the individual members. 00
This analysis of tribal property was confirmed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Sizernore v. Brady.'0 ' In that case the Court
declared, per Van Devanter, J.:
"... lands and funds belonged to the tribe as a community,
and not to the members severally or as tenants in common."10 2
Likewise, in the case of Franklin v. Lynch,'103 the Supreme
Court declared:
"As the tribe could not sell, neither could the individual mem-
bers, for they had neither an undivided interest in the tribal land
nor vendible interest in any particular tract."
In conformity with the foregoing analysis of tribal property,
it has been held that title to Pueblo lands lies with the Pueblo
and not with its members, 04 that the assignment of tribal land to
individual Indians for private occupancy does not deprive the tribe
itself of the right to make disposition of minerals on such land, 0 5
that tribal property of the Cherokee Nation, under the provisions
of the Cherokee constitution, might be used for public purposes, but
could not be diverted to a favored class through per capita pay-
ments. o
Summarizing the cases on the subject, an opinion of the
solicitor of the Interior Department declares:
DOAt pp. 211, 215, 217.
oo(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1909) 168 Fed. 221, at pp. 222-223, citing: Stephens
v. Cherokee Nation, (1899) 174 U. S. 445, 488, 19 Sup. Ct. 722, 43 L. Ed.
1041; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, (1902) 187 U. S. 294, 23 Sup. Ct.
115, 47 L. Ed. 183; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, (1903) 187 U. S. 553, 23 Sup.
Ct. 216, 47 L. Ed. 299; Wallace v. Adams, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1906) 143 Fed.
716, 74 C. C. A. 540; Ligon v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1908) 164 Fed.
670.
101(1914) 235 U. S. 441, 35 Sup. Ct. 135, 59 L. Ed. 308.
20
2 At p. 446.
103(1914) 233 U. S. 269, 271, 34 Sup. Ct. 505, 58 L. Ed. 954.
104United States v. Lucero, (1869) 1 N. M. 422.
'OrReservation Gas Company v. Snyder, (1914) 88 Misc. Rep. 209,
150 N. Y. S. 216; Application of Parker, (1929) 227 App. Div. 107, 237
N. Y. S. 134.
'
06Whitmire, Trustee, v. Cherokee Nation, (1895) 30 Ct. Cls. 138.
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"The powers of an Indian tribe over tribal property are no
less absolute than the powers of any landowner, save as restricted
by general acts ?f Congress restricting the alienation or leasing of
tribal property,'0 7 and particular acts of Congress designed to
control the disposition of particular funds or lands."'10 8
Tribal power over the disposition of tribal property is limited
by Congressional legislation in the following matters:
(1) The leasing of tribal lands by the tribe is subject to ap-
proval or disapproval by the secretary of the Interior or his
authorized representative, 10 9 except -where the tribe has been in-
corporated under a charter which provides for the termination of
this supervisory power.
(2) Tribal land may not be sold, mortgaged or conveyed,"10
except by way of exchange for lands of equal value on reserva-
tions under the act of June 18, 1934."'-
lo7Citing U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 177, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 177. See
note 110 infra. This statement is strongly confirmed by the decisions of the
Supreme Court in United States v. Shoshone Tribe, (1938) 304 U. S. 111,
and United States v. Klamath Indians, (1938) 304 U. S. 119, which dealt
a deathblow to the theory that Indians have a "mere right of occupancy"
amounting to a tenancy at will, in reservation lands. These cases held that
where lands were taken from Indian tribes in violation of laws and treaties
the Indians were entitled, under appropriate jurisdictional acts, to recover
not only the value of the land surface but the value of timber and minerals
as well. "For all practical purposes," the Court declared, in the Shoshone
Case, "the tribe owned the land." (at p. 117)
108(1934) 55 I. D. 14, 50.
109U. S. C., Title 25, secs. 397, 398, 402, 25 U. S. C. A. secs. 397,
398, 402.
12oU. S. C., Title 25, sec. 177, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 177 provides:
"Purchases or grants of lands from Indians. No purchase, grant, lease
or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any
Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity,
unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
the Constitution...."
The broad language used in this statute has been restricted in judicial
interpretation to actual conveyances of land or interests in land. Thus the
courts have held that a tribe may issue grazing permits on tribal land
without specific statutory authorization, on the theory that the provision in
U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 179, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 179, imposing a penalty upon
persons driving stock to range upon Indian lands, without the consent of the
Indian tribe, in effect recognizes the right of the tribe to permit the use
of its lands for grazing purposes upon payment of a consideration. United
States v. Hunter, (1885) 4 Mackey, (D.C.) 531; Kirby v. United
States, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1921) 273 Fed. 391, (aff'd (1922) 260 U. S.
423, 23 Sup. Ct. 144, 67 L. Ed. 329). Similarly, U. S. C., Title 25, section
80, imposing a penalty upon persons settling on Indian lands, has been
judicially interpreted as implying that an Indian tribe has power to permit
such settlement upon such conditions as it may prescribe. See Morris v.
Hitchcock, (1904) 194 U. S. 384, 24 Sup. Ct. 712, 48 L. Ed. 1030; Mfa.ey
v. Wright, (1900) 3 Ind. T. 243, 54 S. W. 807, (aff'd (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1900) 105 Fed. 1003) ; Buster and Jones v. Wright (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905)
135 Fed. 947, app. dism. 203 U. S. 599, 27 Sup. Ct. 777, 51 L. Ed. 334.
'Sec. 4, (1906) (48 Stat. at L. 985, 986; U.S.C., Title 25, sec. 464,
25 U.S.C.A. sec. 464).
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(3) Tribal funds in the Treasury of the United States may
not be expended by the tribe without appropriation by Congress.,-"
This limitation does not apply to tribal funds in the treasury of
the tribe, which may be expended by tribal governing bodies with-
out specific authorization by an act of Congress.
(4) Tribal funds which have been appropriated for certain
purposes by act of Congress, or which are available in accordance
with permanent legislation for expenditure by the secretary of the
interior for certain designated purposes"1 3 are thereby taken outside
the control of the tribe, unless the tribe is organized under section
16 of the Act of June 18, 1934. Tribes so organized, having re-
ceived by statute the power "to prevent the ... disposition .. .
of . . . tribal assets without the consent of the tribe," 4 are in a
position to prevent the expenditure of tribal funds by administra-
tive officials. An appropriation act, unless it contains specific
language to the contrary, authorizes but does not compel an' ex-
penditure. The administrative officer authorized to expend funds
must conform to all existing legislation outside of the appropria-
tion act. If he cannot legally spend the money appropriated, the
money remains in the United States Treasury and he has not
violated any law. So, if Indian tribal funds are appropriated by
Congress for a designated purpose, e.g., pay of tribal officers, and
the tribe forbids such use of its tribal funds, the administrative
officials cannot legally expend the funds. Presumably an attempt
to expend such tribal funds without tribal consent could be
blocked by injunction proceedings. Whether or not injunction
proceedings are brought, the comptroller general might assess
liability for improper payments for expenditures of tribal funds
not authorized by the tribe. Failing any such relief, the tribe
might resort to suit against the guilty officers, or, under a proper
jurisdictional bill, suit against the United States.
(5) Contracts affecting tribal resources may not be made ex-
cept with the approval of the commissioner and the secretary of
the interior," 5 or pursuant to a tribal constitution or charter
under the Act of June 18, 1934, and supplementary legislation.
It remains to be added that with the incorporation of Indian
tribes, tribal property becomes corporate property. Although no
case has yet passed definitely upon the question, it would seem
112U. S. Code. Title 25, sec. 123.
113See preceding footnote.
"4Act of June 18, 1934, sec. 16.
'"5U. S. C., title 25, secs. 81, 85, 25 U. S. C. A. secs. 81, 85.
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that since a corporation is held to be a "person" within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment, and entitled as such to protection
against deprivation of property without due process of law, the
property of an incorporated Indian tribe is protected not only
against arbitrary administrative action but even against arbitrary
congressional action. The holding of the United States Supreme-
Court in the case of Choate v. Trapp'-6 would then be applicabk
to the funds and to the unallotted land of an Indian corporation,
as well as to the property of individual allottees. A serious consti-
tutional question would, therefore, be presented if Congress should
enact legislation depriving an incorporated Indian tribe of prop-
erty, real or personal, without the consent of the tribe, (except
for public use and then only upon payment of just compensation).
8. Indian Domestic Relations. If the doctrine of Indian self-
government laid down by Chief Justice Marshall is sound, the
domestic relations obtaining among tribal members remain sub-
ject to tribal law and custom until Congress otherwise provides.
The case of United States v. Quiver,"1 7 provided a critical test of
the doctrine of Worcester v. Georgia, then eighty-three years old.
The case arose through a prosecution for adultery in the
United States district court for South Dakota. Both of the indi-
viduals involved were Sioux Indians and the offense was alleged
to have been committed on one of the Sioux reservations.
The Department of Justice authorized prosecution on the
theory that Congress, by section 3 of the Act of March 3, 1887,218
had terminated the original tribal control over Indian domestic
relations.
The question was: Did this statute, which applied to all areas
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, apply to the con-
duct of Indians on an Indian Reservation? The Supreme Court
held that it did not. The analysis of the subject by Mr. Justice
Van Devanter is so illuminating, not only on the immediate ques-
tion of jurisdiction over adultery, but on the broader question
of the civil jurisdiction of an Indian tribe, that it is worth quoting:
"At an early period it became the settled policy of Congress
116(1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56 L. Ed. 941, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional an act of Congress which modified earlier
legislation protecting Indian lands from state taxation during a fixed period.
The case is discussed at pages 197-199, infra.
117(1916) 241 U. S. 602, 36 Sup. Ct. 699, 60 L. Ed. 1196.
USThat section provides: "That whoever commits adultery shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding three years; ..
(24 Stat. at L. 635, U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 516, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 516.)
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to permit the personal and domestic relations of the Indians with
each other to be regulated, and offenses by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian to be dealt with, according
to their tribal customs and laws. Thus the Indian Intercourse
Acts of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. at L. 469, and of March,
1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. at L. 139, provided for the punishment of
various offenses by white persons against Indians and by Indians
against white persons, but left untouched those by Indians against
each other; and the act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, sec. 25, 4 Stat.
at L. 729, 733, while providing that "so much of the laws of the
United States as provides for the punishment of crimes committed
within any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States shall be in force in the Indian country," qualified
its action by saying, "the same shall not extend to crimes committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian."
That provision with its qualification was later carried into the
Revised Statutes as Secs. 2145 and 2146. This was the situation
when this court, in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, held that
the murder of an Indian by another Indian on an Indian reserva-
tion was not punishable under the laws of the United States and
could be dealt with only according to the laws of the tribe. The
first change came when, by the act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341,
sec. 9, 23 Stat. at L. 362, 385, now sec. 328 of the Penal Code,
Congress provided for the punishment of murder, manslaughter,
rape, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon,
arson, burglary, and larceny when committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian. In other respects the
policy remained as before....
"We have now referred to all the statutes. There is none
dealing with bigamy, polygamy, incest, adultery, or fornication,
which in terms refers to Indians, these matters always having been
left to the tribal customs and laws and to such preventive and cor-
rective measures as reasonably could be taken by the administra-
tive officers."'110
It is clear, then, that in the absence of federal legislation, the
domestic relations of members of an Indian tribe are subject to
the unwritten or written laws of the tribe. Federal legislation on
the subject of Indian domestic relations covers only a few particu-
lars. There is a statute which provides that the issue of Indian
custom marriage shall in all cases be deemed legitimate for pur-
poses of inheritance of allotments.12 0 Rape, including statutory
rape, is made a federal offense by act of Congress.' 2 ' Guardians
appointed by Indian tribal councils are, by another special act
m At pp. 603-605.
220U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 371, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 371.
121U. S. C., Title 18, sec. 548, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 548.
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of Congress, forbidden to receive federal moneys due to orphaned
or incompetent Indians.
1 22
In all other respects Congress has left the field vacant, and the
jurisdiction of the tribe is undisputed.
The validity of marriages and divorces consummated in ac-
cordance with tribal law or custom is recognized in state and
federal courts.
123
Marriages by Indian custom have been recognized as valid,
even in those cases where Indian custom sanctioned polygamy. As
was said in Kobogun v. Jackson Iron Co. :124
"The testimony now in this case shows what, as matter of
history, we are probably bound to know judicially, that among
these Indians polygamous marriages have always been recognized
as valid, and have never been confounded with such promiscuous
or informal temporary intercourse as is not reckoned as mar-
riage. While most civilized nations in our day very wisely dis-
card polygamy, and it is not probably lawful anywhere among
English-speaking nations, yet it is a recognized and valid institu-
tion among many nations, and in no way universally unlawful.
We must either hold that there can be no valid Indian marriage,
or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by Indian
usage are so regarded. There is no middle ground which can be
taken, so long as our own laws are not binding on the tribes. They
did not occupy their territory by our grace and permission, but
by a right beyond our control. They were placed by the Consti-
tution of the United States beyond our jurisdiction, and we had
no more right to control their domestic usages than those of
Turkey or India.
"We have here marriages had between members of an Indian
tribe in tribal relations, and unquestionably good by the Indian
rules. The parties were not subject in those relations to the laws
of Michigan, and there was no other law interfering with the full
jurisdiction of the tribe over personal relations. We cannot inter-
122U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 159, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 159.
123Carney v. Chapman, (1918) 247 U. S. 102, 38 Sup. Ct. 449, 62
L. Ed. 1005; Boyer v. Dively, (1875) 58 Mo. 510; Johnson v. Dunlap,
(1918) 68 Okla. 216, 173 Pac. 359; Cyr v. Walker, (1911) 29 Okla. 281,
116 Pac. 931; Hallowell v. Commons, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1914) 210 Fed. 793;
Earl v. Godley, (1890) 42 Minn. 361, 44 N. W. 254, 18 A. S. R. 517, 7
L. R. A. 125; Ortley v. Ross, (1907) 78 Neb. 339, 110 N. W. 1108;
People ex rel. La Forte v. Rubin, (1905) 113 App. Div. 584, 98 N. Y. S.
787; Butler v. Wilson, (1915) 54 Okla. 229, 153 Pac. 823; Proctor v.
Foster, (1924) 107 Okla. 95, 230 Pac. 753; Davis v. Reeder, (1924) 102
Okla. 106, 226 Pac. 880; Pompey v. King, (1923) 101 Okla. 253, 225 Pac.
175; Buck v. Branson, (1912) 34 Okla. 807, 127 Pac. 436; Johnson v.
Johnson, (1860) 30 Mo. 72; Unussee v. McKinney, (1928) 133 Okla. 40,
270 Pac. 1096; and cf. Connolly v. Woolrich (1867) 11 Lower Can. Jur. 197.
124(1889) 76 Mich. 498, 43 N. W. 602.
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fere with the validity of such marriages without subjecting them
to rules of law which never bound them."125
The jurisdiction of a tribal court over divorce actions has been
recognized by federal and state courts. 26
The basis of tribal jurisdiction over divorce was set forth with
lucidity in the case of Wall v. Williamson :".
"It is only by positive enactments, even in the case of con-
quered and subdued nations, that their laws are changed by the
conqueror."
The fact that Indians may obtain marriage licenses from state
officials does not deprive the tribe of jurisdiction to issue a divorce
where the parties are properly before a tribal court. In this re-
spect Indians are in the same position as persons who, after marry-
ing under the law of one state, may be divorced under the laws of
another state or of a foreign nation.
It is, however, a matter of state law whether state courts will
recognize the validity of such divorces. In the absence of reported
decisions on this point it is not possible to say.with any certainty
how states are likely to treat such tribal divorces in cases that
come up in state courts. So far as the federal government is
concerned, the validity of such divorces is conceded. The current
Law and Order Regulatiofis of the Indian Service, approved by the
secretary of the interior on November 27, 1935, 12 recognize the
validity of Indian custom marriage and divorce and leave it to the
governing authorities of each tribe to define what shall constitute
such marriage and divorce.129
9. The Municipal Status of Indian Tribes. The question of
whether an Indian tribe is a mob or a municipality was presented
by the case of Turner v'. United States.8 0 The plaintiffs were
white men, who, by procedures of questionable legality, bad se-
cured a lease to approximately 400 square miles of Creek tribal
land. When they proceeded to fence the land, the tribal treasurer
and many other Indians of the vicinity rose in protest and de-
stroyed sLxty miles of fence, which was as much as the plaintiffs
had built. Congress thereafter enacted a statute authorizing the
court of claims to hear the plaintiffs' claim against the Creek
125At pp. 507-509. See, to the same effect, State v. McKenney, (1883)
18 Nev. 182. 200. 2 Pac. 171.123Rayrnond v. Raymond, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1897) 83 Fed. 721; (1888)
19 Ops. Atty. Gen. 109.
127(1845) 8 Ala. 48, 51.
128See (1935) 55 I. D. 401.120(1935) 55 I. D. 407.
130(1916) 51 Ct. Cl. 125, aff'd (1919) 248 U. S. 354, 39 Sup. Ct 109,
63 L. Ed. 291.
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Nation. The court of claims finally dismissed the plaintiffs' suit,
declaring:
"Plaintiff's petition avers that the damage was inflicted by a
mob of Indians of the Creek or Muskogee Nation or Tribe; and
if that be true the Creek Nation is not to be held responsible for
the mob's action. It can be said of the Creek Nation, as was
said of the Cherokee Nation, that it has 'many of the rights and
privileges of an independent people. They have their own con-
stitution and laws and power to administer their internal affairs.
They are recognized as a distinct political community, and treat-
ies have been made with them in that capacity.' Delaware Indians
v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U. S. 127, 144. They are not sovereign
to the extent that the federal or state governments are sovereign,
but this suit is predicated upon the assumption that their laws
are valid enactments, and it recognizes the separate existence of
the Creek Nation. When, therefore, the effort is made to hold
them responsible as a nation for the illegal action of a mob we
must apply the rule of law applicable to established governments
under similar conditions. It is a familiar rule that in the absence
of a statute declaring a liability therefor neither the sovereign nor
the governmental subdivisions, such as counties or municipalities,
are responsible to the party injured in his person or estate by mob
violence."''
The decision of the court of claims; affirmed by the Supreme
Court, dearly establishes that an Indian tribe is not a mere collec-
tion of individuals, and that the action of a mob, even though it
should include all the members of a municipality, is not the action
of the municipality.
In the Turner Case the question was whether the tribe was
liable for acts of individuals. The converse question, whether an
individual is liable for the debts of the tribe was raised in the case
of Parks v. Ross."2 This was a case that arose out of the forced
migration of the Cherokee Indians, in 1838, from Georgia to what
is now Oklahoma. John Ross, the Principal Chief of the Chero-
kee Nation, was authorized to contract for the hire of wagons to
transport the Cherokee Indians and as much of their belongings
as they had managed to save from the whites who had overrun their
lands. One of the wagon-owners who entered into such a contract
later brought suit against John Ross to recover extra compensation
'-1At pp. 152, 153, citing: Louisiana v. Major, (1883) 109 U. S. 285,
291, 3 Sup. Ct. 211, 27 L. Ed. 936; Hart v. Bridgeport, (C.C. Conn. 1876) 11
Fed. Cas. 6149; Gianfortone v. New Orleans, (C.C. E.D. La. 1894) 61
Fed. 64; City v. Abbagnato, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1894) 62 Fed. 240; Murdock
Grate Co. v.. Commonwealth, (1890) 152 Mass. 28, 31, 24 N. E. 854, 8
L. R. A. 399.132(1850) 11 How. (U.S.) 362, 13 L. Ed. 730.
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to which he deemed himself entitled. The Supreme Court held
that there was no basis for a claim against Principal Chief Ross,
since he had entered into the contract on behalf of the tribe. The
Court declared, per Grier, J.:
"Now, it is an established rule of law, that an agent who con-
tracts in the name of his principal is not liable to a suit on such
contract; much less a public officer, acting for his government.
As regards him the rule is, that he is not responsible on any
contract he may make in that capacity; and wherever his contract
or engagement is connected with a subject fairly within the scope
of his authority, it shall be intended to have been made officially,
and in his public character, unless the contrary appears by satis-
factory evidence of an absolute and unqualified engagement to be
personally liable.
"The Cherokees are in many respects a foreign and independent
nation. They are governed by their own laws and officers, chosen
by themselves. And though in a state of pupilage, and under the
guardianship of the United States, this government has delegated
no power to the courts of this District to arrest the public repre-
sentatives or agents of Indian nations, who may be casually with-
in their local jurisdiction, and compel them to pay the debts of their
nation, either to an individual of their own nation, or a citizen
of the United States."'' 33
The two cases of Turner v. United States and Parks v. Ross
establish the position of an Indian tribe as a municipality, which is
not responsible for the acts of its members and is responsible for
the acts of its agents.
10. The Form of Tribal Government. One of the popular
superstitions about Indians current among the non-Indian portion
of our population is the notion that every Indian male over the
age of thirty is either a chief or a big chief. This superstition
is of great help to those Indians or pseudo-Indians who seek
to earn a respectable living by selling snake oil to the sick, or
by selling their fellow-tribesmen's land to land speculators or to
the federal government, or by lecturing to women's clubs and
Congressional committees, or by endowing needy lawyers with
tribal business. It is generally very difficult to persuade those
who have paid for or profited by such transactions with Indian
"chiefs" that the Indian in question was not an officer of his
tribe and had no tribal lands, tribal suits, or tribal wisdom to
give away. It is, therefore, a matter of some concern to an Indian
tribe that it should have the right to define a framework of offi-
cial action and to insist that acts of individuals and groups that
BSBAt p. 374.
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do not fall within that framework are not acts of the tribe. This
definition of a framework of government may take the form of
a written constitution, or it may take the form of the British con-
stitution, a disorderly mass of practices shading off into par-
liamentary procedure and court etiquette but including at its
core the essential canons that we invoke, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to decide whether the acts of certain individuals are
governmental or non-governmental or anti-governmental.
The question of whether action done in the name of an Indian
tribe is in truth tribal action has been before state and federal
courts on many occasions, and in every case the courts have held
that the definition of the form of tribal government is a matter
for the decision of the Indians themselves.
Such a holding, for example, is found in the case of Pueblo
of Santa Rosa v. Fall .' 4 Certain attorneys claimed to represent
an Indian pueblo and asserted ownership of a large area which the
federal government considered public domain. The Indians
themselves, apparently, denied the authority of the attorneys in
question to put forward such a claim, but the attorneys justified
their action on the basis of an alleged agreement with the "captain"
of the pueblo. When the case came before the Supreme Court,
that body found that according to the custom of the pueblo the
"captain" would have no authority to act for the pueblo in a
matter of this sort, and that such action without the approval of the
pueblo council would be void. On the issue of fact the Court
found:
"That Luis was without power to execute the papers in ques-
tion, for lack of authority from the Indian council, in our opinion,
is well established. 13 5
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the
lower court which had dismissed the suit on the merits, and held:
". .. the cause must be remanded to the court of first in-
stance with directions to dismiss the bill on the ground that the
suit was brought by counsel without authority, but without
prejudice to the bringing of any other suit hereafter by and with
the authority of the alleged-Pueblo of Santa Rosa." 3 '
The holding of the Supreme Court that the dismissal must be
without prejudice to the pueblo is no less important than the dis-
- n-issal itself. The same case had reached the Suprtme Court
on an earlier occasion, on a motion to dismiss the suit for lack
134(1927) 273 U. S. 315, 47 Sup. Ct. 361, 71 L. Ed. 658.
135At pp. 319-320.
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of capacity in the plaintiff pueblo, and on that issue the Supreme
Court had upheld the pueblo, pointing to the fact that under spe-
cial federal statutes it was a corporation, with the right to sue, and
insisting that this right extended to the bringing of a suit against
the secretary of the interior if that official violated the rights of
the pueblo. The Supreme Court decisively rejected the argu-
ment of the government that a pueblo could not bring suit against
the secretary of the interior.137
Thus, the two decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of
the Pueblo of Santa Rosa supplement each other and constitute
an important bulwark of Indian tribal rights. The Indian tribe
has the right to defend its interests through legal process, but no
official or pretended official or agent of the tribe can commit
the tribe by his action unless that action falls within the frame-
work of government established by the tribe itself.
Other decisions upholding the right of an Indian tribe to fix
its own form of government are collected in a footnote.13
The power to define a form of government is one which has
been exercised to the full, and it would be impossible within the
compass of this paper to analyze the forms of government that
different Indian communities have established for themselves.
Indeed, it may be said that the constitutional history of the Indian
tribes covers a longer period and a wider range of variation than
the constitutional history of the colonies, the states and the
United States. It was some time before the immigrant Colum-
bus reached these shores, according to eminent historians, that
the first federal constitution on the American Continent was
drafted, the Gayaneshagowa, or Great Binding Law of the Five
Nations (Iroquois) .1 3  It was in this c6nstitution that Americans
first established the democratic principles of initiative, recall,
referendum, and equal suffrage. 4 ' In this constitution, also,
'scAt p. 321.137Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, (1919) 249 U. S. 110, 39 Sup. Ct.
185, 63 L. Ed. 504.
138 Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, (1906) 203 U. S. 76, 27 Sup. Ct. 29, 51
L. Ed. 96; Nofire v. United States, (1897) 164 U. S. 657, 17 Sup. Ct. 212,
41 L. Ed. 588; Rawlins and Presbey v. United States, (1888) 23 Ct. Cl.
106; Whitmire, Trustee, v. Cherokee Nation, (1895) 30 Ct. Cl. 138; Dela-
ware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, (1903) 38 Ct. Cl. 234; (1849) 5 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 79; (1855) 7 ibid. 142; (1888) 19 ibid. 179, 229; (1904) 25 ibid.
308; Mt. Pleasant v. Gansworth, (1934) 150 Misc. Rep. 584, 271 N. Y. S.
78; In re Darch, (1933) 147 Misc. Rep. 836, 265 N. Y. S. 86; Seneca Nation
v. John, (1891) 27 Abb. N. C. 253, 16 N. Y. S. 40.
130A. C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations (New York
State Museum Bulletin, No. 184).
140Secs. 93, 94, 95, 96.
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were set forth the ideal of the responsibility of governmental
officials to the electorate, and the obligation of the present genera-
tion to future generations which we call the principle of conserva-
tion.141
Between the time of the adoption of the constitution of the
Five Nations and the contemporaneous efforts of more than a
hundred Indian tribes to reduce unwritten custom to writing,
there is a fascinating history of political development that never
has been pieced together. Students of Indian law know of the
achievements of the Five Civilized Tribes in constitution-making
by reason of occasional references in the decided cases to the
Cherokee, 142 Creek, 143 and Choctaw1 44 constitutions. What is not
generally known is that many other Indian tribes have, from time
to time, reduced their unwritten constitutional customs to writing.
The writing of Indian constitutions under the Wheeler-Howard
Act of June 18, 1934, is therefore no new thing in the legal history
of this continent, and it is possible to hope that some of the
political wisdom that has already stood the test of centuries of
revolutionary change in Indian life is now being embodied in the
constitutions of the hundred or so tribes which have been or-
ganized under that Act.1
45
'4'Sec. 28.
'
42
"The constitution of the Cherokees was a wonderful adaptation to
the circumstances and conditions of the time, and to a civilization that was
yet to come. It was framed and adopted by a people some of whom were
still in the savage state, and the better portion of whom had just entered
upon that stage of civilization which is characterized by industrial pursuits;
and it was framed during a period of extraordinary turmoil and civil dis-
cord, when the greater part of the Cherokee people had just been driven
by military force from their mountains and valleys in Georgia, and been
brought by enforced immigration into the country of the Western Chero-
kees; when a condition of anarchy and civil war reigned in the territory-
a condition which was to continue until the two branches of the nation
should be united under the treaty of 1846 (27 Ct. Cl. 1); yet for more
than half a century it has met the requirements of a race steadily advancing
in prosperity and education and enlightenment so well that it has needed,
so far as they are concerned, no material alteration or amendment, and
deserves to be classed among the few great works of intelligent statesman-
ship which outlive their own time and continue through succeeding genera-
tions to assure the rights and guide the destinies of men. (Journeycake v.
Cherokee Nation and United States, (1893) 28 Ct. Cl. 281, 317-318.)
'43Ex parte Tiger, (1898) 2 Ind. Terr. 41, 27 S. W. 304.
'144McCurtain v. Grady, (1896) 1 Ind. Terr. 107, 38 S. W. 65.
145As of January 15, 1939, ninety-seven Indian tribes had adopted con-
stitutions under the Act of June 18, 1934 and its Alaska and Oklahoma ex-
tensions. No constitution thus far adopted by the Indians has been vetoed
by the secretary of the interior.
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II. CiviL LIBERTIES OF INDIANS
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all nwn are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights .... 146
It would take us far beyond the scope of an already too long
essay to define all those civil liberties which Indians share with
their fellow-citizens of other races. We must be content here to
trace the special forms which general civil liberties take with re-
spect to the peculiar legal status of Indians.
The courts have pointed to two ways in which an Indian may
meet injustices directed at him as an Indian. One way is to give
up the status that subjects him to oppression: if he is a member
of an oppressed tribe he may give up his citizenship in that tribe.
The other way is to attack the oppressive measure itself.
The former alternative is based upon the individual right of
expatriation. The latter is based upon the right of a racial minor-
ity to be immune from racial discrimination. This latter right our
Indian population shares with every other minority group in the
United States, and since all the minority groups that have reason
to fear discriminatory legislation make up together a great majority
of our population, the asserted right to be immune from racial
discrimination lies at the heart of our democratic institutions.
1. The Right of Expatriation. Oppression against a racial
minority is more terrible than most other forms of oppression,
because there is no escape from one's race. The victim of eco-
nomic oppression may be buoyed up in the struggle by the hope
that he can improve his economic status. The victim of religious
oppression may embrace the religion of his oppressors. The vic-
tim of political oppression may change his political affiliation.
But the victim of racial persecution cannot change his race. For
these victims there is no sanctuary and no escape.
If special legislation governing Indians refers to a racial
group, 47 there is no way in which the individual Indian can avoid
the impact of such laws. If, on the other hand, such laws refer
only to persons having a certain social or political status, then,
presumably, the oppressed Indian, by changing that status, can
escape the force of such legislation. The issue whether the statutes
'46The Declaration of Independence of the United States, in Congress,
July 4, 1776.
'47The thesis that our law governing Indians is "racial law" is de-
fended by Heinrich Krieger, of the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissen-
schaft, in an article, Principles of the Indian Law and the Act of June 18,
1934, (1935) 3 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 279 (announced as part of a disserta-
tion on "American Racial Law").
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that subject Indians to special treatment refer to a racial group or
to a group defined in social and political terms is therefore a poig-
nant issue not only to our 350,000 Indian citizens but as well to
citizens of other races.
Some light on this issue we shall find in the constitution of the
United States. The constitution expressly refers to Indians in
two connections. Article 1, section 8, confers upon Congress the
power to regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes." Article 1,
section 2, declares that "Indians not taxed" shall not be counted
as "free persons" in determining the representation of any state
in Congress. 14s An Indian who is not a member of any tribe and
who does pay taxes is, therefore, in the same class as a white man,
so far as the constitution itself takes us.
Two other clauses of the constitution refer indirectly to In-
dians, and provide, by way of addition to the Congressional power
"to regulate Commerce with . . . Indian tribes," two independent
sources of Congressional power respecting Indian affairs. Article
VI provides that "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land." At the time of the adoption of the constitution, the United
States already had subsisting treaties with various Indian tribes,
and continued to make such treaties for almost a century after-
wards. Here, again, the constitution gives the federal govern-
ment power to deal with Indian tribes, and indirectly with the
members of those tribes, but no power with respect to Indians
who are not affiliated with any tribe. Finally, Article IV, section
3, of the United States constitution provides that Congress "shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regu-
lations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States." This clause provides a base for a large part
of the activities of the federal government with respect to Indian
reservations and restricted Indian property, but again it gives no
authority to govern Indians as a racial group.
In view of these constitutional provisions, we have the right
to assume, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, that
when Congress enacts legislation referring to Indians, it is referring
to a group defined in political rather than racial terms, and that
one who is an Indian, biologically speaking, may nevertheless be
exempt from legislation affecting Indians.
This issue never has been squarely before the United States
14SThe phrase is repeated in the fourteenth amendment.
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Supreme Court, but the viewpoint here put forward is confirmed
by the only statement the Supreme Court has made upon the ques-
tion, the dictum of the majority opinion in the Dred Scott Case:
"... if an Indian should leave his nation or tribe and take up
his abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all
the rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from
any other foreign people."' 45
There is one federal case which squarely raised the question
whether Indians can avoid oppression at the hands of the federal
government by renouncing their allegiance to their tribe and aban-
doning the reservation assigned to their use.
The case of United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook"50
(C.C. Neb. 1879) arose out of an attempt of a band of Ponca In-
dians led by Chief Standing Bear to escape from a reservation in
Indian Territory to which they had been removed by the Interior
Department. After a few months on their new reservation they
succeeded in escaping to Nebraska, where they took up a residence
with friendly Omaha Indians. Brigadier General Crook, Com-
mander of the Military Department of the Platte, was ordered to
arrest Standing Bear and his followers and to return them to the
Ponca reservation in Indian Territory. Standing Bear managed to
secure attorneys, who sued out a writ of habeas corpus against
General Crook. The principal ground of the writ was the claim
that Standing Bear and his followers had renounced their member-
ship in the Ponca tribe. Since they were no longer members of the
tribe, it was argued that neither the Interior Department nor the
United States Army could force these Indians to live upon the
Ponca reservation.
The issue of fact was thus formulated by the Court, per
Dundy, J.:
"It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other,
that the relators had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their
connection with the tribe to which they belonged; and upon this
point alone was there any testimony produced by either party
hereto."''
On the issue of fact the Court found as follows:
"Standing Bear, the principal witness, states that out of five
hundred and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation
in Dakota to the Indian Territory, one hundred and fifty-eight
died within a year or so, and a great proportion of the others were
sick and disabled, caused, in a great measure, no doubt, from
149Scott v. Sanford, (1856) 19 How. (U.S.) 393, 404, 15 L. Ed. 691.
150(C.C. Neb. 1879) 5 Dill. 453, 25 Fed. Cas. no. 14,891.
5,125 Fed. Cas. at p. 696.
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change of climate; and to save himself and the survivors of his
wasted family, and the feeble remnants of his little band of
followers, he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return
to his old home, where, to use his own language, 'he might live
and die in peace, and be buried with his fathers.' He also states
that he informed the agent of their final purpose to leave, never
to return, and that he and his followers had finally, fully, and
forever severed his and their connection with the Ponca tribe
of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band, of
Indians, and to cut loose from the government, go to work, be-
come self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and customs of a higher
civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable
and laudable purpose, all who were able so to do went to work to
earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the same language,
and with whom many of the Poncas have long continued to inter-
marry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to
make them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reser-
vation, and when thus employed, that they were arrested by order
of the government, for the purpose of being taken back to the
Indian Territory. They claim to be unable to see the justice, or
reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by force from
their own native plains and blood relations to a far-off country,
in which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their
reception. The land from which they fled in fear has no attractions
for them. The love of home and native land was strong enough
in the minds of these people to induce them to brave every peril
to return and live and die where they had been reared. The bones
of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the land
they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved and
protected, and formed a part of what was to them a melancholy
procession homeward ... .
In view of the foregoing facts the Court reached the conclu-
sion that the Indian relators
". .. did all they could- to separate themselves from their
tribe and to sever their tribal relations, for the purpose of be-
coming self-sustaining and living without support from the gov-
ernment. This being so, it presents the question as to whether or
not an Indian can withdraw from his tribe, sever his tribal rela-
tion therewith, and terminate his allegiance thereto, for the pur-
pose of making an independent living and adopting our own
civilization.
"If Indian tribes are to be regarded and treated as separate
but dependent nations, there can be no serious difficulty about the
question. If they are not to be regarded and treated as separate,
dependent nations, then no allegiance is owing from an individual
Indian to his tribe, and he could, therefore, withdraw therefrom
at any time. The question of expatriation has engaged the atten-
15225 Fed. Cas. at pp. 698, 699.
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tion of our government from the time of its very foundation. Many
heated discussions have been carried on between our own and
foreign governments on this great question, until diplomacy has
triumphantly secured the right to every person found within our
jurisdiction. This right has always been claimed and admitted
by our government, and it is now no longer an open question. It
can make but little difference, then, whether we accord to the
Indian tribes a national character or not, as in either case I think
the individual possesses the clear and God-given right to withdraw
from his tribe and forever live away from it, as though it had no
further existence. If the right of expatriation was open to doubt
in this country down to the year 1868, certainly since that time
no sort of questions as to the right can now exist. On the 27th
of July of that year congress passed an act, now appearing as
section 1999 of the Revised Statutes, which declares that:
'Whereas, the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right
of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and, whereas, in the recog-
nition of this principle the government has freely received emi-
grants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citi-
zenship. . . . Therefore, any declaration, instruction, opinion,
order or decision of any officer of the United States which denies,
restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is declared
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the republic.'
"This declaration must forever settle the question until it is
reopened by other legislation upon the same subject."
The federal court, in granting a writ of habeas corpus to
Standing Bear against General Crook, established a precedent
which many Indians, since Standing Bear, have followed, and
which many administrators since General Crook have recognized.
In the closing decades of the nineteenth century and down to very
recent times, the trend of legislation and of administration with
respect to Indian affairs was to decrease the area of tribal land
and the authority of tribal councils, to multiply the restrictions
upon the use that Indian tribes might make of their.remaining
property, and to break down tribal governments, tribal customs,
and tribal social life. But always one door to freedom was left
open: the individual Indian might accept an allotment of land,
have the restrictions upon his land tenure removed, adopt "the
habits of civilized life," abandon his tribal relations, attain citizen-
ship, and thus achieve freedom from the oppression of Indian
Bureau control. This was the way in which the Indian Bureau
was to dissolve the Indian problem. The more intolerable the
oppression of the Bureau upon the life of the tribe, the more suc-
cessful was the Bureau in achieving its objective. The year's
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quota of spiritual refugees from the tribal life was, on each
reservation, the criterion of the Indian superintendent's success.
It did not matter much that those who grasped at freedom through
renunciation of tribal relations and federal property frequently
reached their goal broken in spirit and swindled of their lands.
To many Indians, as well as to many Indian administrators, this
was an advance from serfdom to freedom, from barbarism to
civilization.
It may be noted, in passing, that so deeply rooted was the
Indian yearning for freedom, and so thoroughly were the Indians
drilled to conceive of freedom as the final result of abandoning
tribal relations, that when the Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18,
1934, offered to Indian tribes a common road to freedom from
Indian Bureau control, the Act was widely misunderstood by the
Indians themselves. The idea of an Indian achieving freedom
through the removal of property restrictions and the breaking of
tribal relations was familiar. The idea of an entire Indian tribe
achieving freedom in an organized way through the machinery
of constitutions, corporate charters, tribal ordinances, and the
transfer of federal authorities and services to tribal agencies,
was new and strange. Tribal government seemed to many Indians
to promise only a continuation of "rubber stamp" tribal business
committees, hand-picked by local Indian Bureau employees, and
shorn of all power except the power to surrender tribal assets.
Consequently, many of the tribes most anxious to achieve free-
dom from federal control, such as the New York Indians, the
Sioux and Assiniboine of Fort Peck, the Navajos, and Klamaths,
voted to exempt themselves from the bill that promised tribal
self-government, while many other tribes that never had felt them-
selves greatly oppressed went ahead, under the Wheeler-Howard
Act, to establish the machinery of self-government.
The right of expatriation established by the Standing Bear
Case remains a significant human right, even where Indian tribes
are actually moving in an organized way toward the ideal of
freedom from Indian Bureau supervision. The right of expatria-
tion is an answer not only to federal oppression, but to tribal op-
pression as well. It would be remarkable if the development of
Indian self-government failed to give rise to dissatisfied individ-
uals and minority groups who considered their tribal status a mis-
15325 Fed. Cas. at p. 699.
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fortune. History shows that nations lose in strength when they
seek to prevent such unwilling subjects from renouncing allegiance.
2. Imunity From Racial Discrimination. The right to be
immune from racial discrimination is in part a constitutional right
derived from the fifth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, in
part a statutory right, and for the rest a moral right, implicit in
the character of democratic government but not always protected
by adequate legal machinery. In the first instance the struggle of
the Indian to achieve legal equality with his white neighbors re-
quires an attack upon unconstitutional discriminatory legislation.
The second case calls for an attack on discriminatory administra-
tive practices that are in conflict with existing law. The third situ-
ation calls for positive effort to secure appropriate legislation that
will secure to the Indian equal treatment before the law.
The most explicit constitutional protection given to racial mi-
norities is found in the provisions of the fifteenth amendment with
respect to the right of franchise:
"Sec. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.
"Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."
Congress has given force to this constitutional amendment
through a series of statutes which make it a crime to deprive any
person of any civil rights "by reason of his color or race," and
otherwise protect the elective franchise and civil rights of minority
racial groups. 5 4
The United States Supreme Court was called upon to enforce
these constitutional and statutory guarantees in the case of United
States v. Reese, ' involving the denial of suffrage to Negroes. In
this case the Supreme Court declared, per Waite, C. J.:
"If citizens of one race having certain qualifications are per-
mitted by law to vote, those of another having the same qualifica-
tions must be. Previous to this amendment, there was no consti-
tutional guaranty against this discrimination: now there is. It
follows that the amendment has invested the citizens of the United
States with a new constitutional right which is within the protect-
ing power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimina-
tion in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race,
254Act of May 31, 1870, sec. 1 (16 Stat. at L. 140; R.S. sec. 2004, U.S.C.,
Title 8, sec. 31, 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 31) ; Act of March 4, 1909, secs. 19-20 (35
Stat. at L. 1092, R.S. sees. 5503, 5510, U.S.C., Title 18, sees. 51-53, 18
U.S.C.A. sees. 51-53).1-1(1875) 92 U. S. 214, 218, 23 L. Ed. 478.
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color, or previous condition of servitude. This, under the express
provisions of the second section of the amendment, Congress may
enforce by 'appropriate legislation.'"
Again, in the case of Neal v. Delaware, 156 the Supreme Court
ruled that a provision of the Delaware constitution which re-
stricted the right of suffrage to the white race had been rendered
invalid by the passage of the fifteenth amendment. The Court
declared, per Harlan, J.:
"Beyond question the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment
had the effect, in law, to remove from the State Constitution, or
render inoperative, that provision which restricts the right of suff-
rage to the white race."
Under these decisions of the United States Supreme Court it
would appear that statutes which deny the franchise either to
Indians generally or to Indians of a certain class, where white
men of that class would be permitted to vote, are unconstitutional.
A ruling to this effect was issued by the solicitor of the interior
department on January 26, 1938.117 A similar opinion with respect
to the clause in the constitution of the state of Washington dis-
franchising Indians has been rendered by the attorney general of
that state.'
The state constitutions of Idaho,159 New Mexico, 160 South
Dakota,' 6 ' and Washington 62 contain specific provisions exclud-
ing from the franchise Indians "not taxed," or Indians "maintain-
ing tribal relations." These provisions are apparently still en-
forced in the states of Idaho and New Mexico. There can be little
doubt that if the issue is properly raised in these states the federal
courts will hold the provisions to be unconstitutional.
Apart from those states which by their election laws expressly
discriminate against Indians there are several states which effectu-
ate such discrimination indirectly. In Arizona, for example, the
156(1880) 103 U. S. 370, 389, 26 L. Ed. 567.
157Opinion M-29596.
15s"If an Indian has become a citizen of the United States, the state
has no power to make his right to vote dependent upon the payment of
taxes when no such requirement is made with respect to the members of
any other race. Consequently the proviso to section 1, article 6, supra,
is in conflict with the fifteenth amendment and therefore invalid unless it be
given the construction above." (Per Attorney General W. V. Tanner,
opinion rendered June 15, 1916.)
See also opinion of G. W. Hamilton, Attorney General of Washington,
dated April 1, 1936 (opinion No. 4086).
159ldaho, Constitution article VI, section 3.
'6ONew Mexico, Constitution article VII, section 1. See also New
Mexico, Statutes, (1929) 41-210L; 1927 ch. 210, sec. 210.
161South Dakota, Compiled Laws (1929) sec. 92.lo2Washington, constitution article VI, section 1.
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constitution denies the franchise to "persons under guardian-
ship,"16 3 and the Arizona courts have held that Indians subject to
federal jurisdiction are "under guardianship" and therefore dis-
qualified from voting. 6 It is believed that the basic premise of
this decision is erroneous. Subjection to federal jurisdiction does
not make Indians persons "under guardianship." Although John
Marshall spoke of the relation of the United States to an Indian
tribe as similar to that of a guardian to a ward, and although this
apt figure has often been applied, more or less metaphorically, to
the relation of the federal government to individual Indians, the
fact remains that Congress never has enacted a statute making
Indians "wards of the government." Certainly no court has ever
adjudicated the Indian race to be a race "under guardianship."
Indeed it is hard to see how any court would have the right to
put any class of American citizens under a special "guardianship."
The claim of such a right would seriously threaten the liberty of
any group which might sustain a special relation to the federal
government, e.g., soldiers, relief workers, government employees,
or beneficiaries of social security legislation. Towards all these
groups the federal government may appear, in certain phases, as
a Great White Father, but that is surely no sufficient basis for a
denial of the franchise.
In Colorado, Utah, and perhaps other states legislation which
does not in terms deny the right of franchise to Indians has been
administered in a way to effect such discrimination. The prob-
lem of fighting such discrimination presents greater difficulties
than those which are presented by openly discriminatory legisla-
tion. The Supreme Court, however, on several notable occasions
has held unconstitutional election laws which, while innocent on
their face, were interpreted and applied in a discriminatory manner.
Thus, in the case of Guinn v. United States,65 the Supreme
Court of the United States held unconstitutional a "grandfather
clause" in the constitution of Oklahoma which, without expressly
mentioning Negroes, had the effect of discriminating against them
by denying the franchise to illiterates whose ancestors had not
voted prior to 1868, while allowing other illiterates to vote.
The Indian thus has reason to hope that if other means of
10 3Article VII, sec. 2.
'
64Porter v. Hall, (1928) 34 Ariz. 308, 27 Pac. 411.
105(1915) 238 U. S. 347, 35 Sup. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340. See, to the
same effect, Myers v. Anderson, (1915) 238 U. S. 368, 35 Sup. Ct. 932, 59
L. Ed. 1349, holding unconstitutional a "Grandfather Clause" in Maryland.
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vindication of his right of franchise fail, the United States
Supreme Court will, in the end, vindicate that right which, in a
democracy, is the basis of all other rights.
In fields other than the exercise of the franchise, constitutional
guaranties against racial discrimination are less clear. Those fields
in which the Indian must rely upon enlightened legislation and
public opinion rather than upon courts in the vindication of his
rights are beyond the scope of this essay. It is fitting, however,
in passing, to mention three significant victories that have been
won for the cause of Indian rights in recent years, in the fields
of legislation and administration.
On May 21, 1934, a dozen ancient laws which limited the free-
dom of speech of Indians, empowered the commissioner of Indian
Affairs to remove from an Indian reservation persons whose
presence he considered "detrimental," and sanctioned various
measures of military control within Indian reservation boundaries,
were repealed by Congress. 68
Again, on. November 27, 1935, the secretary of the interior
revoked the regulations of the Indian Office, first promulgated in
1884 and slightly modified in 1904, which empowered the superin-
tendent of an Indian reservation to act as judge, jury, prosecuting
attorney, police officer and jailor. In place of this barbarous sys-
tem a judicial system was established, based on the consent of the
governed, and similar in general outline to the judicial systems pre-
vailing in non-Indian municipalities. Under the new system de-
fendants have a right to formal charges, jury trial, power to sum-
mon witnesses, and the privilege of bail.167
A third significant victory in the Indian's struggle for equality
before the law was won on February 17, 1937, when efforts,
hitherto successful, to exclude Indians and Indian lands from
soil conservation benefit payments were stamped as unauthorized
and unlawful by the solicitor of the department of agriculture.
There remain many fields in which the issue of discrimination
has yet to be fought out,-e.g., social security benefits and educa-
tional opportunities. Perhaps the permanent problem of Indian
liquor laws belongs in this category. But this is material that does
not yet belong in a history of the defense of Indian rights in the
federal courts.
'
6 6Act of May 21, 1934 (48 Stat. at L. 787), repealing sections 171, 172,
173, 186, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, and 226 of Title 25 of the U. S. C.
167(1935) 55 I. D. 401.
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III. PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIANS
"There have been comparatively few cases which discuss the legis-
lative power over private property held by the Indians. But these few
all recognize that he is not excepted from the protection guaranteed
by the constitution. His private rights are secured and enforced to
the same extent and in the same way as other reidents or citizens
of the United States."16S
Indian property rights are of two types-rights of the tribe and
rights of the individual Indian. Rights of the former type have
been considered incidentally in our analysis of the legal status of
tribal property. There remains the task of outlining the rights of
individual Indians. In so far as these rights are distinctively
Indian they involve two questions: (1) What are the rights of an
individual member of an Indian tribe with respect to tribal prop-
erty? (2) What are the rights of an individual Indian with respect
to individual restricted property?
1. The Right to Share in Tribal Property. In the case of
Mason v. Sams,'eD the plaintiffs, Indians of the Quinaielt Tribe,
had been denied the right to utilize fishing sites on the Quinaielt
Reservation. The defendant, the superintendent of the reservation,
took the position that under Interior Department regulations "for
the conservation and preservation of the salmon supply of the
Quinaielt River" the commissioner of Indian affairs had made the
right to fish in the Quinaielt River dependent upon the payment of
certain license fees, and had assigned all available fishing sites
to Indian licensees other than the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, on the
other hand, contended that such regulations were not authorized
by any law and were in contravention of the treaty under which
the lands of the Quinaielt Reservation had been reserved "for
the use and occupation of the tribes and bands aforesaid . . . and
set apart for their exclusive use." The language of this treaty is
typical of that used in many other treaties, and the issue raised in
this case is therefore of general application.
The plaintiff asked for an injunction against the enforcement
of the regulations in question. The defendants moved to dismiss
the suit on the ground that the commissioner of Indian affairs and
the secretary of the interior were authorized to issue the regula-
tion- in question and were necessary parties, and that since they
had not been named as party defendants the plaintiffs' suit could
not be maintained. The defendant was unable to cite any specific
authority for the regulations but relied upon the vague and gen-
168Choate v. Trapp, (1912) 224 U. S. 665, 677, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56 L.
Ed. 941.
z69(D.C. Wash. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 255.
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eral language of section 463 of the Revised Statutes17 which pro-
vides:
"Section 2. Duties of commissioner. The commissioner of
Indian affairs shall, under the direction of the secretary of the in-
terior, and agreeably to such regulations as the president may pre-
scribe, have the management of all Indian affairs and of all mat-
ters arising out of Indian relations."
This statute was enacted to define the duties of the commis-
sioner of Indian affairs. It did not create any substantive powers
to govern Indians, who were at the time of its enactment actually
as well as legally self-governing. The powers of the president, to
which the powers of the commissioner were expressly subordinated
by this statute, are elsewhere defined as limited to two subjects:
"carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to
Indian affairs -and for the settlement of the accounts of Indian
affairs. 1 17 ' This, then, was the alleged basis for the regulations
upon which the defendant stood. The importance of the issue
presented in this case is indicated by the number of other regula-
tions of the Indian Service which have no other authority than
the Act of 1832 cited.
The Court put the issue in these terms:
"The question for determination is whether, under the treaties
and laws affecting Indians, Indian Tribes, and tribal rights, the
commissioner of Indian affairs and secretary are vested with a
discretion in this matter. If they are so vested, they are necessary
parties and the bill must be dismissed .... However, if the com-
missioner and secretary are not so vested with the authority exer-
cised by them in promulgating these regulations, the motion to dis-
miss should be denied...."
In addressing itself to this question, the Court pointed out that
the right to take fish in this stream was, under the treaty, "a right
common to the members of the tribe," that "the fish in the waters
of this stream do not belong to the state, nor to the United States;
but to the Indians of this reservation," and concluded that, in the
absence of any tribal agreement the commissioner of Indian affairs
had no authority to promulgate the regulations in question.
The decision in Mason v. Sams thus stands as a milestone in
the defense of Indian rights. From this decision two conclusions
may be drawn: (1) that the individual Indian has a right to the
'
70Act of July 9, 1832, sec. 1 (4 Stat. at L. 564) as amended by Act of
July 27, 1868, sec. 1 (15 Stat. at L. 228); U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 2, 25
U. S. C. A. sec. 2.
'
7
'Rev. Stat. 465; Act of June 30, 1834, sec. 17 (4 Stat. at L. 738)
U. S. C., Title 25, sec. 9, 25 U. S. C. A. sec. 9.
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use of a fair share of the assets of the tribe; and (2) that the
Indian Bureau has no authority, in the absence of tribal agree-
ment, to deprive any member of the tribe of the right to equal
participation in tribal assets.
2. Rights in Individual Restricted Property. Despite popular
impressions to the contrary, the individual Indian has the same
right as any other citizen to make contracts, to acquire and dis-
pose of property, and to sue and be sued in the state or federal
courts. -72 The real problem of Indian property rights arises
only in connection with restricted Indian property, and more par-
ticularly with respect to allotted lands.
The break-up of Indian tribal lands and funds into individual
portions was a major imperative of Indian policy for more than a
century. It was thought that this break-up was morally necessary
in order to civilize the Indian. Consequently, while the tendency
in white economic life was towards closer organization of business,
of labor and of farmers, towards larger ranches and farm units,
and towards the substitution of large scale timber, mining, and
grazing operations for family-size operations, the opposite tend-
ency was imposed upon Indian economic life. The break-up of
tribal lands left in the hands of individual Indians pieces of
land which, in most instances, the Indian could not profitably
utilize, and the federal government then stepped back into the
picture to administer the pieces. Under this system of property
supervision Indians frequently complain that they are allowed
no part in the management of their own property, and that in
effect the government handles Indian property as it handles, let
us say, a wild-game refuge-with the well-being of the occupants
in mind but without conceding to said occupants any legal rights.
Occasionally this Indian complaint has reached the stage of
litigation, and the courts have been asked to decide whether the
Indian had any constitutional rights in what was said to be "his"
restricted property. The most famous of such cases is that of
Choate v. Trapp. 7 ' The issue raised in the case is stated in the
opening words of Justice Lamar:
"The eight thousand plaintiffs in this case are members of
the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes. Each of them holds a patent
to 320 acres of allotted land issued under the terms of the Curtis
Act (June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. at L. 495, 507, c. 517), which con-
'17See Brown, The Indian Problem and the Law, (1930) 39 Yale L. J.
307, 314, and cases cited.
173(1912) 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56 L. Ed. 941.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tained a provision 'that the land should be non-taxable' for a
limited time. Before the expiration of that period the officers of
the State of Oklahoma instituted proceedings with a view of
assessing and collecting taxes on these lands lying within that
State. The plaintiffs' application for an injunction was denied."
Here was a situation in which the plaintiff Indians had given
up their right to share in tribal property in exchange for indi-
vidual parcels of tax exempt land, and within two years after the
completion of the transaction Congress had attempted to withdraw
an essential part of the consideration.
The Supreme Court recognized "that the plenary power of
Congress over the Indian Tribes and tribal property cannot be
limited by treaties so as to prevent repeal or amendment by a
later statute."17 4  "But there is," the Court declared,
"a broad distinction between tribal property and private prop-
erty, and between the power to abrogate a statute and the author-
ity to destroy rights acquired under such law.. Y7
"But the provision that the land should be non-taxable was
a property right, which Congress undoubtedly had the power to
grant. That right fully vested in the Indians and was binding
upon Oklahoma.' 6
"The patent issued in pursuance of those statutes gave the
Indian as good a title to the exemption as it did to the land itself.
Under the provisions of the fifth amendment there was no more
power to deprive him of the exemption than of any other right
in the property. No statute would have been valid which reduced
his fee to a life estate, or attempted to take from him ten acres,
or fifty acres, or the timber growing on the land. After he
accepted the patent the Indian could not be heard, either at law
or in equity, to assert any claim to the common property. If he
is bound, so is the tribe and the government when the patent
was issued.1
77
"There have been comparatively few cases which discuss the
legislative power over private property held by the Indians. But
those few all recognize that he is not excepted from the protection
guaranteed by the constitution. His private rights are secured
174At p. 671.
175At. p. 671.
17GAt p. 673, citing: Kansas Indians, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 737, 756,
18 L. Ed. 667; United States v. Rickert, (1903) 188 U. S. 432, 23 Sup. Ct.
478, 47 L. Ed. 532.
1T7At pp. 673-674.
"'8Citing: In re Heff, (1905) 197 U. S. 488, 504, 25 Sup. Ct. 506, 29
L. Ed. 848; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, (1902) 187 U. S. 294, 307, 23
Sup. Ct. 115, 47 L. Ed. 183; Jackson ex. dem. Smith v. Goodell, (1822) 20
Johns. (N.Y.) 188; Lowry v. Weaver, (C.C. Ind. 1846) 4 McLean 82, 15
Fed. Cas. No. 8584; Whirlwind v. Von der Ahe, (1896) 67 Mo. App. 628;
Taylor v. Drew, (1860) 21 Ark. 485, 487.
INDIAN RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
and enforced to the same extent and in the same way as other
residents or citizens of the United States.1 17  His right of
private property is not subject to impairment by legislative
action, even while he is, as a member of a tribe and subject to
the guardianship of the United States as to his political and per-
sonal status. . . The decree refusing to enjoin the assessment
of taxes on the exempt lands of plaintiffs must therefore be re-
versed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion.' 7 9
The decision in Choate v. Trapp stands as a landmark in the
history of judicial protection of Indian rights. What is important
is not the right of tax-exemption which the decision confirmed.
The Supreme Court had held, as far back as 1866, that tribal
lands and restricted allotted lands are not subject to taxation, in
the absence of express authorization by Congress.'3 ' The real
significance of the decision in Choate v. Trapp was the holding
that Congress itself could not authorize taxation of Indian lands
after promising the Indians that the lands would be tax-exempt.
To this day, Congress has never again enacted a statute that
withdrew from Indian hands property rights lawfully vested,
and every piece of proposed legislation that falls within this
description is analyzed today in terms of the Court's opinion in
that case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The defense of Indian rights in the federal courts is a signifi-
cant part of the pageant of American liberty. Across the pan-
orama of the years pass judges who were tolerant enough to
appreciate the grievances of an oppressed people and courageous
enough to vindicate rights that Presidents, cabinet officers, army
generals and reservation superintendents had violated. Chief
justice Marshall, defending the rights of the Cherokee Nation
which the hardened Indian fighter in the White House refused to
enforce, Judge Dundy, issuing his writ of habeas corpus against
General Crook, and the long procession of their fellow justices
who have made Indian law-not the least of them Justices Grier,
Sanborn, Lamar and Van Devanter-have played their part in the
defense of American liberty. And across the decades, there march
old Indian chiefs and warriors, forgotten criminals and peaceful
victims of the white man's exploitation, each playing his part
in the struggle to vindicate the human rights of a vanquished race.
1'7At pp. 678-79.
18 OThe Kansas Indians, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 737, 18 L. Ed. 667.
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The murderer, Crow Dog, and the leader of exiles, Standing
Bear,--John Ross, the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation in
its trek to Indian Territory across the Trail of Tears, the Quin-
aielt Indians who insisted upon their right to fish on their own
Reservation, the Choctaws and Chickasaws who insisted that the
United States fulfill its promise that their allotted lands be exempt
from taxation-all are part of this pageant of American liberty.
For our democracy entrusts the task of maintaining its most
precious liberties to those who are despised and oppressed by
their fellow men.
